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INTRODUCTION
Shirking and sharking, in all their many varieties, have been sown broadcast
by the ill-fated cause; and even those who have contemplated its history from
the outermost circle of such evil, have been insensibly tempted into a loose
way of letting bad things alone to take their own bad course, and a loose be-
lief that if the world go wrong, it was, in some off-hand manner, never meant
to go right.
1
This Article reexamines economic theories of the firm from a legal
perspective. These theories are said to have "dominated" and produced a
"revolution" in legal scholarship in recent years,2 particularly in the field
of enterprise organization.3 In this Article, I accept the insights of this
1. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK Housa 21-22 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1901) (1852).
2. Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on the Theory of Corpo-
rate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 213 (1993); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Man-
agement Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 659 (1996) (describing the economic
theories of the firm as "now the dominant paradigm in corporate law"); Aleta G. Estreicher,
Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 513,
515 (1993) (arguing that analysis based on agency costs "still reigns supreme in the academic
literature"). For some leading examples of this genre, see Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching
Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992); William J.
Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency
Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 385; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corpora-
tions and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271 (1986); and Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freerid-
ers in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 59-80 (1982).
3. I use the term "enterprise organization" to include legal agency, employment, partner-
ships, and corporations. For a casebook written along these lines, see ALFRED F. CONARD ET
AL., ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION (4th ed. 1987). See also Eric W. Orts, The Future of Enter-
prise Organization, 96 MICH. L. REV. - (1998) (book review) (arguing in favor of this broad
conceptual approach). The term also includes nonprofit associations. Cf. Developments in the
Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1992). Although some of the analysis
offered here may be applied to nonprofit organizations, the topic is left outside the scope of this
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scholarship, but recommend a significant expansion of its theoretical
premises. In contrast to most economic accounts, I argue that legal the-
ory is needed for an accurate description of the business firm. In particu-
lar, I contest economic theories of the firm that fail to appreciate the im-
portance of legal relationships of agency authority, power, and hierarchy.
My main claim is that a recovery of traditional legal principles helps
to clarify some problems in economic theories of the firm. These prob-
lems include omissions of both a descriptive account of how authority,
power, and hierarchy are created within firms4 and a prescriptive discus-
sion of how this authority, power, and hierarchy may be misused A le-
gal perspective can also help to resolve the conundrum in economics of
distinguishing between firms and markets.6 The legal theory of the firm
and its boundaries offered here brings together elements of various eco-
nomic theories within a unified framework .
My analytic style is the reverse of the usual article in "law and eco-
nomics." Most law-and-economics scholarship begins with a legal prob-
lem and then applies economic analysis to find a solution. Instead, I begin
with an economic problem-namely, conflicting theories of the firm-
and use legal analysis to overcome conceptual difficulties.8
In this endeavor, some problems of conflicting terminology become
apparent. Economists and lawyers often use the same terms differently. I
argue for a precise use of terms such as "agency" and "contracts" that
have legal origins and meanings. At the same time, any discussion of the
"firm" must include an understanding of how economists have used the
term given the roots of the idea in economic theory. The debate is not
only semantic. A combination of legal and economic analysis opens the
door for other disciplines besides economics to describe the social nature
of the entities called firms.9
Article. The focus here is on the business firm.
4. See infra Parts I, II, IV.
5. See infra Part VI.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Parts IV, V.
8. This methodology is consistent with a recent recommendation for a synthesis in legal
scholarship to include "the microanalysis of institutions." Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal
Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1393 (1996). Rubin describes a willingness to recognize the importance of noneconomic factors
as characteristic of a "Post-Chicago School of Law and Economics." Id. at 1404; cf. RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 426-43 (1995) (describing the "new institutional economics" and
its relation to neoclassical law and economics). For another useful approach employing both
economic and legal analysis to firms, though with a different emphasis, see HENRY HANSMANN,
THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996).
9. My interdisciplinary account is limited to law and economics (and perhaps a social theory
combining them), but other social sciences are also helpful in studying firms. See, e.g., John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Folklore of Investor Capitalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1970, 1982, 1988-89 (1997)
(reviewing MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reconstructs two building
blocks for a theory of the firm: legal agency and agency costs. In contem-
porary market economies, the law of agency gives individuals the power
to enter into relationships that result in the construction of firms. The
economics of agency gives a partial explanation (in addition to other
economic reasons) for the ever-changing variety of these organizations.
Part II recommends an amendment to the economic conception of
agency costs to include not only the costs of agents or shirking but also
the costs of principals or sharking. Expanding on Dickens' description of
the "many varieties" of "shirking and sharking" in Bleak House, the idea
of sharking refers to the costs of principals who abuse their positions of
authority and power within firms to act self-servingly. Sharking also re-
fers to the costs of quasi-principals or "superior agents" who act with the
authority of principals regarding lower-level agents under their direc-
tion.0 Because economists do not ordinarily focus on the relationships of
authority, power, and hierarchy in legal agency, they have tended to
overlook the costs of sharking.1
Parts III and IV then turn to examine economic theories of the firm
more broadly. Part III examines the difficulty that economic theory has
in distinguishing between firms and markets. An analytical focus known
in economics as "methodological individualism"12 runs into a paradox
when confronted with the existence of both firms and markets. To re-
solve this paradox, I distinguish between consumer markets for goods and
services and organizational metamarkets of business firms. 3 Economic
success in consumer markets, deriving in part from efficiency in organiza-
tional metamarkets, drives a Schumpeterian process of "creative destruc-
CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA (1996)). Ethics is also important-a dimen-
sion that is discussed in the conclusion of this Article.
10. In other words, the concept of quasi-principals refers to people who are technically legal
agents of the firm but who exercise authority as de facto principals for certain purposes. The
most important example is the chief executive officer of a public corporation. The alternative
term, "superior agent," is used in an initial draft of a new Restatement of Agency. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.09 cmt, cmt c, illus. 1 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1997). For
further discussion, see infra Section II.B.
11. This is beginning to change, however. For recent economic accounts of authority and
power in the firm, see Phillip Aghion & Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organiza-
tions, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1997); and Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory
of the Firm, - Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming).
12. Kenneth J. Arrow, Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge, 84 AM. ECON.
Assoc. PAPERS & PROC. 1, 1 (1994).
13. The term metamarket describes a "higher or second-order" market for organizational
forms that occurs above but not separate from consumer markets for goods and services. See
THE CONCISE OxFoRD DICTIONARY 745 (1990) (defining the Greek root); cf. Jane S. Schacter,
Metademocracy, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1995). This organizational metamarket is distin-
guished from consumer markets for analytical purposes only. In practice, both metamarkets and
consumer markets operate together in the market-writ-large of everyday life. This distinction is
further described infra Section III.B.
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tion" of business firms in capitalist society.14 Part IV considers economic
theories of the firm in addition to those that emphasize agency costs.
Competing economic theories see transaction costs, contracts, property,
and employment to be essential. I conclude that each of these models
contributes to understanding the nature of the business firm, but none of
them gives an adequate descriptive account of the role of law.
The theory of the firm advanced in Part V complements economic
theories by collecting their fundamental insights under a legal umbrella.
Legal forms of business enterprise called "firms" range from one-person
pure sole proprietors to relational firms of corporate groups. 5 Firms of
more than one person are described as a nexus of agency relationships.
Legal boundaries of the firm are drawn along the lines of control, owner-
ship, and employment.
A number of areas of law recognize the importance of boundaries.6
Describing the boundaries of business firms, however, has been mostly
left to economists. The question "What is a firm?" has generated an
enormous amount of economic theory, beginning with Nobel laureate
Ronald Coase's The Nature of the Firm7 and continuing vigorously to-
day. 8 This Article contributes to the debate by advancing a theory of the
firm that draws as heavily on law as on economics. It speaks to both law-
yers and economists in arguing that firms cannot be understood in terms
of either law or economics alone. A combination of both, with neither
dominating the other, is required for an adequate descriptive account. 9
14. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (5th ed. 1976)
("The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the
new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the
new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates.... This process of Crea-
tive Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.").
15. A common understanding of the "firm" is "a business concern" characterized by "a
group of persons working together." THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 441 (1990). The ac-
count offered here departs from this definition in recognizing one-person firms and groups of
firms. See infra Section III.B and Part V.
16. See Symposium, Surveying Law and Borders, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1037 (1996). Legal
boundaries are not only "spatial" but conceptual, including those "that separate different value
systems." William Ian Miller, Sanctuary, Redlight Districts, and Washington, D.C., 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1235, 1246 (1996).
17. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937), reprinted in R.H.
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
18. Two leading economists have recently published book length treatments of the firm. See
HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE BUSINESS FIRM (1995); OLIVER HART, FIRMS,
CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); see also THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE
FIRM: A READER (Louis Putterman & Randall S. Kroszner eds., 2d ed. 1996) (collecting arti-
cles on the subject); THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT
(Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991) (same).
19. Coase's original work strongly supports this view emphasizing economics and law. See
infra Section IV.B. In his 1991 Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture in Economic Sciences,
Coase emphasized that "the rights which individuals possess, with their duties and privileges,
will be to a large extent, what the law determines. As a result the legal system will have a pro-
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Describing firms as legal entities also yields a more balanced norma-
tive approach to their regulation than strictly economic theories. Part VI
argues that legal constraints should aim to reduce the costs of shirking
and sharking as well as to enforce contractual bargains within firms? °
Recognizing the importance of agency and principal costs helps to ex-
plain, for example, the need for mandatory fiduciary duties. The lesson
with respect to classical agency costs or shirking is well known.21
Principal costs or sharking also support the judicial enforcement of fidu-
ciary duties, rather than whittling them away.2 Four illustrations are
given of situations in which principal costs may appear in corporations:
majority shareholder "oppression" of minority shareholders,23 excessive
executive compensation, noncontractual but unjustified harm to debt-
holders, and financial reengineering of capital structure designed solely
to benefit one group of participants in a firm at the expense of others.
I. AGENCY LAW AND AGENCY COSTS
Let every eye negotiate for itself
And trust no agent .... 24
Shakespeare's advice to distrust agents does not apply to all agency
relationships.2 The law of agency recognizes that some people act on
behalf of others, and the business world would be radically different if it
did not. In part because the law recognizes and enforces these relation-
ships, it is possible to trust agents-within limits. Through agency law,
found effect on the working of the economic system, and may in certain respects, be said to con-
trol it." Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 28 OCCASIONAL PAPERS
FROM THE U. CmI. L. SCH., May 1992, at 9-10, quoted in Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Market Effi-
ciency and the Domain of the Firm, 18 J. CORP. L. 173, 174 (1993).
20. Cf. William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Con-
straints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1982) (emphasizing regulatory constraints to moderate the
"conflicting interests and goals" among business participants as well as contractual bargains).
21. See infra Section I.B.
22. For examples of the currently popular argument for reducing mandatory fiduciary du-
ties, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 90-108 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fi-
duciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 429-32 (1993); and Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1126-30 (1981). For opposing argu-
ments favoring continuing enforcement of fiduciary duties in various circumstances, see, for ex-
ample, Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness, and Corporate Struc-
ture, 25 UCLA L. REv. 738 (1978); Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate
Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595 (1997); and Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U.
TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975).
23. The term "oppression" refers to the problem of protecting the "reasonable expecta-
tions" of minority shareholders in the absence of a contractual remedy. 2 JAMES D. COX ET AL,
CORPORATIONS § 14.13 (1995).
24. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABour NOTHING, act 2, sc. 1.
25. The context of the quotation is "the office and affairs of love," id., the agency implica-
tions of which lie outside the scope of this Article.
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principals are liable for contracts entered and torts committed by their
agents. 26 Trusting agents is fundamental to any economic system.27 At
the same time, Shakespeare rightly advises against trusting agents too
much.2 Economic theories of agency costs provide a formal account of
the tendency of agents to act for themselves rather than their principals.
A problem in economic theory is to account for the agency relationships
that nevertheless prevail in all walks of life.29
When one considers both legal and economic accounts of agency, it
becomes apparent that lawyers and economists do not fully understand
one another. Lawyers often fail to appreciate the complexity of economic
theories, and economists often overlook the complexity of the law of
agency and enterprise organization. This Article aims to improve mutual
understanding by bringing together both legal and economic conceptions
of agency.
A. Legal Agency: Authority, Power, and Hierarchy in the Firm
Agency law enables individuals to create relationships of authority
and power among themselves. In this sense, agency provides an example
of what H.L.A. Hart calls "power-conferring" rules.3 "The principles of
agency have made it possible for persons to utilize the services of others
26. In contracts, even "undisclosed" principals may be held liable for contracts entered by
their agents. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 186, 194 (1958). In torts, principals are
vicariously liable for the harmful acts of their agents who are servants under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior. See id § 219(1) ("A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment."); id. § 220 (defining servant). For
further discussion of vicarious liability as forming one of the legal boundaries of the firm, see
infra Subsection V.B.2.
27. Cf. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 23 (1974) ("Trust is an im-
portant lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a
fair degree of reliance on other people's word."); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL
VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 152 (1995) ("We often take a minimal level of
trust and honesty for granted and forget that they pervade everyday economic life and are cru-
cial to its smooth functioning."); TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND
RESEARCH (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (collecting recent research on the
importance of trust); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW 185, 185 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) ("Trust is one of the most impor-
tant institutions binding our society.... Trust enables us to give others the power to manage our
money and to run our businesses."). For critical accounts of the role of trust in modem society,
see also ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OFTRUST (1997); Daryl Koehn, Should We Trust
in Trust?, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 183 (1996).
28. This is perhaps especially true in matters of love, the context of Shakespeare's play, see
supra note 25, but it is also true in business.
29. In economic terms, the benefits of agency relations must often exceed their costs. See,
e.g., DEMSETZ, supra note 18, at 11; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 19, at 184 ("The fact that
much of our economy is dominated by firms suggests that the degree of market imperfection in
a world when such firms could not exist must be very large indeed.").
30. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40-41 (1972); see also Eric W. Orts, Positive Law
and Systemic Legitimacy, 6 RATIO JuRIS 245, 246-47 n.3 (1993) (analyzing Hart's distinction
between power-conferring and duty-imposing rules and collecting sources).
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in accomplishing far more than could be done by their unaided efforts,"
observes the Restatement of Agency.31 Legal agency is ubiquitous,32 and
businesses of all sorts "depend for their existence on agency principles."33
No wonder Oliver Wendell Holmes calls agency one of the "great de-
partments of the law. ' m
Agency principles expressed in law are needed to account for firms
because the essential feature of the firm is not the agreement of individu-
als through contracts-which also characterize transactions in markets-
but the creation of legal authority and power, often in a hierarchical
form.3" Hierarchy is not always necessary. The default rule in partner-
ships, for example, creates equal authority and power in each partner to
bind the other in the market.36 Even general partnerships of equal
authority, however, usually have employees, and employment is usually
hierarchical.37
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. a (1958).
32. See CONARD ET AL., supra note 3, at 3 (describing agency as "embracing all the people
who work for somebody else (or have somebody working for them)"); JOSEPH L. FRASCONA,
AGENCY at ix (1964) (arguing that agency "is as integral a part of activity in society as anything
one can think of").
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. a (1958); see also CONARD ET AL,
supra note 3, at 3 (observing that the primary function of agency law is to make possible the
commercial enterprise which could not exist otherwise).
34. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Agency-Part 1,4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 348 (1891) (agency and
torts); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Agency-Part 11, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1891) (agency and
contracts). Today, many introductory casebooks in enterprise organization neglect the law of
agency. For exceptions to the rule, see CONARD ET AL., supra note 3, at 181-327; DEBORAH A.
DEMOTr, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: DUTIES IN ONGOING
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 67-346 (1991); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 1-27 (2d ed. 1995); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & J. MARK RAMSEYER,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 11-81 (3d ed. 1997).
A new Restatement ofAgency sponsored by the American Law Institute may restore agency law
to its rightful place. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1997).
35. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Finance and the Firm, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 89, 91 (1996) ("[M]any scholars have resisted the impulse to reduce relationships among
participants in a firm to a series of actual or implied market contracts. Hierarchies do exist in
firms, and even if relations within firms can be characterized in a sense as contracts, they may
not easily be assimilated into a simple contractual framework."); see also supra note 11 and ac-
companying text.
36. See UNIP. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1) (1994) ("Every partner is an agent of the partner-
ship for the purpose of its business, and the act of every partner.., for apparently carrying on in
the usual way the business of the partnership of which he [or she] is a member binds the part-
nership .... ). It is also true that small groups of individuals may organize work "cooperatively,
without formal internal organization or direction." Lee E. Preston & James E. Post, The Third
Managerial Revolution, 17 ACAD. MGMT. J. 476, 477 (1974). But the development of hierarchi-
cal organization-perhaps first in military, political, or religious forms-stands as an important
"revolution" in business and economics. See id. at 477-78.
37. However, it is possible for employees to own and participate in the management of
firms. For discussion of the law and economics of employee ownership, see HANSMANN, supra
note 8, at 66-119; Bainbridge, supra note 2; Henry Hansmann, Worker Participation and Corpo-
rate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 589 (1993); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Own-
ership Work?, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990); Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159 (1991); Marlene A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era, 78 CORNELL L.
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Law explains the relationships of authority, power, and hierarchy in
firms. The prominent economic theory of the firm that maintains the firm
"has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in
the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two
people"3 is therefore incorrect." The essence of agency is authority,
power, and hierarchy.
It is important to emphasize that the legal relationships that compose
firms are not simply contracts. Some economists adopt a contractarian
model of law when thinking about firms.4 Although legal agency is most
often created through a special kind of contract, it is something more.4,
A contract alone does not create the open-ended relationships of agency
authority characteristic of most business firms. For example, a business
that hires an employee creates an agency relationship that extends be-
42yond the explicit terms of the employment contract. In corporate law,
to take another example, agency authority inheres in the board of direc-
tors even for participants who join after the corporation is formed.3
Firms are more than a matter of contracts because of the importance of
the relationships of authority and power among principals and agents or-
ganized within a business entity.
A schematic illustration may help to make the point. In the simplest
contract, there are two parties, A and B. In the simplest agency relation-
REV. 899 (1993). Employment is further discussed infra Section IV.D and Subsection V.B.2.
38. Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 777 (1972), reprinted in HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP,
CONTROL, AND THE FIRM: THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIvITY 119,119 (1988).
39. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 663 (observing "a sharp disconnect between Alchian
and Demsetz's argument and the real world of work"). The exception is the one-person firm
without internal agency relationships. See infra Sections III.B, V.A.
40. For further description and criticism of the contractarian theory of the firm, see infra
Section IV.B.
41. Legal agency is often formed by contract, but not always. Creating an agency requires
only "the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his be-
half and subject to his control, and consent by the other to so act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1(1) (1958). Because "agency does not depend upon the intent of the parties to cre-
ate it, nor their belief that they have done so... , there must be an agreement, but not neces-
sarily a contract, between the parties . Id. § 1(1) cmt. b; see also HAROLD GILL
REUSCHLIEN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 12, at 31
(2d ed. 1990) ("The [agency] relationship is most often thought of as being contractual though it
is not necessary that the relationship arise out of a contract."). Unlike most contracts, agency
does not require consideration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 16 (1958); see also
REUSCHLIEN & GREGORY, supra, § 12, at 31. Gratuitous agents are possible. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 16 cmt. b (1958). Also unlike contracts, agency does not
impose a minimum age of capacity. Compare E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 214-20 (2d
ed. 1990) (discussing rule in contracts that agreements made by minors under the age of 18 are
voidable), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 21(1) (1958) ("Any person has capacity
to hold a power to act on behalf of another.").
42. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The employment relationship is also dis-
cussed infra Section IV.D and Subsection V.B.2.
43. The authority structure of the corporation is further discussed infra Section V.D.
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ship, there are three: the principal A, the agent B, and a third-party C.
4
In a contractual relationship between A and B, a third-party may hold A
liable only through contract or tort theories that go to A's own actions,
such as the third-party beneficiary doctrine in contracts 45 or negligence
where A should have known that a danger to a third-party may result.
4 6
In contrast, an agency relationship between A and B raises the possibility
that C may hold A directly liable for the actions of B. This sort of vicari-
ous liability characterizes the firm.4 ' The origin of a business "entity" of
more than one person thus lies in agency law. Firms do not arise from
contracts alone.
Although legal agency explains the existence of firms involving more
than one person, agency law is not sufficient to determine the boundaries
of firms.4' Because legal agency appears outside as well as within firms, a
description of the firm relying purely on agency law would be overinclu-
sive. A good example is a client's decision to retain a lawyer. Although
the lawyer acts as an agent for the client as a principal, a business firm is
not thereby created 9
Legal agency relationships are one foundation of business organiza-
tions. Without legal agency, business firms of any complexity are impos-
sible. By the same token, agency law alone cannot explain the nature of
44. See 1 FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 27, at 14-15 (1914)
(noting that an agency relationship contemplates at least three persons: a principal, an agent,
and a third-party to whom the relation of agency matters or makes relevant). The six possible
combinations of duties and liabilities that result compose the six divisions of the law of agency.
See icL
45. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 41, at 709-44 (discussing contract beneficiaries). Efforts
to clarify the law of third-party beneficiaries have focused on the need for A to have "intended"
to benefit C in the contract with B. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1979)
(describing "intended beneficiary"). For a critical analysis of this approach, see Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358 (1992). Eisenberg proposes a
similar test limited by "the contracting parties' performance objectives." Id. at 1385.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) ("One who undertakes.., to
render services to another which he [or she] should recognize as necessary for the protection of
a third person or his [or her] things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his [or her] failure to exercise reasonable care .... ").
47. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also infra Subsection V.B.2 (discussing
employment relationships and vicarious liability for torts).
48. The various legal types of firms are described in more detail in Part V.
49. There are exceptions. For example, a corporate general counsel hired as a full-time
employee would be counted a part of a firm.
One commentator on a draft of this Article suggested that a lawyer-client relationship
might be considered a "project firm" of relatively short duration, but this approach would de-
fine any contractual or agency relationship as creating a firm. The description offered here is
narrower in part because of the usefulness of maintaining an analytical distinction between
firms and markets. See infra Part III. The usual lawyer-client relationship is best described as an
independent contractor relationship that falls outside the boundaries of the firm on a number of
grounds, including lack of common financial ownership in the enterprise and lack of direct con-
trol on the part of the principal client over the agent lawyer. For further discussion of the legal
boundaries of the firm, see infra Part V.
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firms. Economic considerations also determine the sizes and shapes of
firms.
B. Agency Costs: Classical Shirking
The internal costs of organization known in the economic literature as
agency costs provide one important theoretical explanation for limita-
tions on the size of firms. Firms respond to economic pressures both ex-
ternally in consumer markets and internally. The importance of con-
sumer markets for goods and services is addressed in Part III. Here, the
internal costs of organization are emphasized.
In contrast to the ancient ancestry of agency law,0 economic theories
of agency costs are relatively recent.51 As a term of art, "agency costs"
describe the inevitable risks that agents will act for themselves rather
than their principals. 2 In other words, theories of agency costs start from
the assumption that people will act in their own self-interests. From this
premise, these theories must then explain two facts about the world: (1)
agency relationships exist in great numbers despite their costs, and (2)
agents often act on behalf of their principals.
Agency costs theory explains this empirical reality in terms of two
measures by which a principal can reduce agency costs. First, the princi-
pal may devise mechanisms of monitoring the agent.53 For example, in a
lawyer-client relationship, the client as principal may scrutinize the law-
yer's bill to make sure it is accurate. Or the client may insist on a flat or
fixed fee for the lawyer's services rather than the usual hourly-rate
50. Agency appears in its rudimentary form in Blackstone's Commentaries and in Roman
law. See 1 MECHEM, supra note 44, §§ 11-21, at 5-10 (discussing Blackstone's treatment of the
law of "master and servant"); P.W. DuFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW (1938)
(noting Roman concepts of legal personality that would be translated today into principles of
agency). The first English treatise on agency law is William Paley's Principal and Agent pub-
lished in 1812. See 1 MECHEM, supra note 44, § 23, at 10. Agency in its modem form developed
after the Industrial Revolution in the "commercial age." Id. § 10, at 5 ("A non-commercial soci-
ety, while it might have much use of servants, would have little need of agents.").
51. See, e.g., Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973); see also Norman E. Bowie & R. Edward Freeman, Ethics and
Agency Theory: An Introduction, in ETHICS AND AGENCY THEORY 3, 4 (Norman E. Bowie &
R. Edward Freeman eds., 1992) (describing Ross's article as one of the first "influential" contri-
butions to "modem agency theory").
52. One influential economic theory defines an agency relationship as "a contract under
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the
agent." Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976); see also Daniel Levin-
thai, A Survey of Agency Models of Organizations, 9 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 153, 155 (1988)
(articulating a similar definition derived from literature survey).
53. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 52, at 308 ("The principal can limit divergences
from his [or her] interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring
monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent.").
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method of billing. 4 Second, the principal and agent may agree that the
agent will share in the principal's risk and reward to encourage the agent
to act in the principal's best interest. This is called bonding."5 In the law-
yer-client example, contingency fees illustrate bonding.6
Monitoring and bonding are then combined to define agency costs as
the combination of:
(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal,
(2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, [and]
(3) the residual loss.
57
"Residual loss" refers to the economic costs suffered by the principal due
to the self-interested behavior of the agent. According to this theory,
principals will enter into agency relationships when the sum of these costs
are outweighed by (1) the net gains achieved through monitoring and
bonding and (2) the other economic gains that agency relationships make
possible, including increased efficiency allowed by specialization and
"team production."
58
The classical agency costs approach to the firm emphasizes the need
to monitor and bond agents in order to prevent them from shirking.9 It
is a funny word, shirking, but it is meant seriously. The assumption is that
agents-whether they are employees beholden to managers, or managers
54. It will pay the client to monitor the lawyer if the risks of legal agency costs are large
enough, though economists are also quick to point out the costs of monitoring (e.g., paying
someone to review the lawyer's bills, haggling over a fixed fee, and risking a lower quality of
service if the usual rates are not paid). For a review of current fixed fee billing methods, as well
as a list of the "Top 10 Reasons [Legal] Bills Are Unpaid," see Barry Solomon & Rachel Gib-
bons, Coming to Terms with New Billing Methods, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 23, 1992, at S4.
55. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 52, at 308 ("In addition [to monitoring] in some
situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he [or she]
will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will
be compensated if he [or she] does take such actions.").
56. For a description and criticism of these arrangements, see, for example, LESTER
BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES (1994).
57. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 52, at 308 (citation omitted).
58. Economic theories have emphasized the benefits of specialization and the division of
labor in many historical variations. For three well-known examples, see FRANK KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 271 (Augustus M. Kelley 1964) (1921) (emphasizing the "manifold
specialization of function" in business enterprise); 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 368-94 (Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., 1909) (1859)
(describing the division of labor and specialization in capitalist manufacturing); and ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 3-12 (The
Modem Library 1934) (1776) (including the famous example of specialization in pin-making).
For an economic account of "team production" emphasizing agency costs, see Alchian & Dem-
setz, supra note 38, at 121-24. Other economic theories present competing accounts of the bene-
fits of agency relationships organized within the legal structure of firms. An overview of these
theories is given infra Part IV.
59. One of the best descriptions of shirking is given in Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 38,
at 123, 124-26, 131-33, 137; see also Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the The-
ory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375 (1983), reprinted in DEMSETZ, supra note 38, at 187, 191-
97.
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beholden to the corporate enterprise-will shirk their responsibilities
when given half a chance. In other words, if not sufficiently monitored or
bonded, agents will be lazy or irresponsible-or at least not entirely self-
less in their motivations.0
Agency costs theory has been criticized for assuming an overly pessi-
mistic view of human nature, and there is some weight in this criticism."
Ethical norms, including altruism, may influence people more than some
economists admit. 2 Agency costs theory has also been criticized for "its
narrow view of rationality."63 It is probably not realistic to assume that
agents always want to shirk or "slack off." Often agents like to work.
4
Still, it remains true that employees and other agents often find them-
selves tempted not to work as hard as they should. As a result, a theory
of agency costs has descriptive power as long as many people act in a self-
interested fashion much of the time. Because any realistic theory of the
firm must account for the tendency of people to act self-servingly, the
concept of agency costs is helpful in understanding the economics of
firms.65 The economics of agency helps to determine whether a firm con-
60. See also infra Section III.A (discussing neoclassical assumptions of selfishness and
methodological individualism).
61. For a collection of essays criticizing economic agency theories on ethical grounds, see
ETHICS AND AGENCY THEORY, supra note 51. For an analysis of ethical problems posed under
a contractual theory of the firm, see John R. Boatright, Business Ethics and the Theory of the
Firm, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 217 (1996). The contractual theory of the firm, which is related to
agency costs theory, is discussed and criticized infra Section IV.B.
62. A connection between law and norms is taken for granted in this Article without elabo-
ration. For a recent collection of articles on the topic, see Symposium, Law, Economics &
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996). For an argument that norms are as important as legal
constraints in corporate law, see Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Cor-
porate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009 (1997).
63. Levinthal, supra note 52, at 154 ("As with neoclassical theory more generally, agency
theory can be criticized from a behavioral perspective for its narrow view of rationality and its
assumptions regarding economic agents' cognitive abilities."). Behavioral economics has not yet
been widely influential in the legal literature. For exceptions applying behavioral economics to
federal securities regulation, see Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral
Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms),
146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997); and Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some
Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers,
84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996).
64. For a criticism of the assumption in agency-costs theory that agents will always have a
disutility for effort, see Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Richart Costa, Managerial Incentives and
Capital Management, 101 Q.J. ECON. 835 (1986).
65. For the most important expositions of economic theories of agency costs as they relate
to theories of the firm, see Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 38; Demsetz, supra note 59; Eugene
F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980), reprinted in
THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note 18, at 315; Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 52; and Benjamin Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 367 (1983). For critical surveys of the
literature, see Kathleen M. Eisenstadt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 57 (1989); and Levinthal, supra note 52.
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tinues, changes, or disappears."
Although agency costs help to explain the economic dynamics of
firms, they are not sufficient to explain the existence of firms and their
boundaries. Whether it makes economic sense to enter into a firm with a
legal agency structure depends on other economic costs and benefits, as
well as agency costs.67 In addition, agency costs cannot explain how
rather than why some work is internalized in firms rather than contracted
for across markets. In other words, economic theories cannot explain the
mechanisms by which people bind themselves together into firms rather
than dealing with each other as individuals in markets." Only in combi-
nation with legal principles can economic theories, including those that
emphasize agency costs, provide a conceptual foundation for under-
standing what business firms are and where they come from.
II. PRINCIPAL COSTS
Shark: to prey like a shark upon; to victimize, sponge upon, swindle; to op-
press by extortion.
69
Economic theory tends to see the costs of agency relationships from
the principal's perspective-hence agency costs. But this tells only half
the story. The costs that principals impose on agents should also be con-
sidered.
Take, for example, the lawyer-client relationship. In economic theory,
the agency costs of the relationship are borne by the client as principal.
The client bears the risk that the lawyer will shirk. In economic terms,
Dickens' description of the never-ending case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce
is a story of the agency costs of lawyers.70 Perhaps even the legal system
66. Agency costs also exist in agency relationships that do not cohere into firms. For exam-
ple, in the lawyer-client relationships discussed above, see supra Section I.A, clients may incur
agency costs. A good example is a lawyer in a class action who may tend to act contrary to the
best interests of the class of plaintiffs. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action:
A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 633 (1987) (describing the agency costs of plaintiff
class action attorneys).
67. Other economic costs and benefits of firms are described infra Parts II, III, IV.
68. This puzzle and a proposed solution are further discussed infra Part III.
69. 9 THE OXFoRD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 634 (1933). Shark used in this fashion shares its
etymology with shirk. Both words trace their origins to the old German schurke, which is now
used to refer generally to a "scoundrel or villain." Id. at 633.
70. Dickens' description of "shirking and sharking," see supra text accompanying note 1,
refers to "the ill-fated cause" of this self-perpetuating and "perennially hopeless" litigation.
DICKENS, supra note 1, at 21, 52. As Dickens further describes the case:
The Lawyers have twisted it into such a state of bedevilment that the original mer-
its.., have long disappeared from the face of the earth. It's about a Will, and the trusts
under a Will-or it was, once. It's about nothing but Costs, now. We are always ap-
pearing, and disappearing, and swearing, and interrogating, and filing, and cross-filing,
and arguing, and sealing, and motioning, and referring, and reporting, and revolving
about the Lord Chancellor and all his satellites, and equitably waltzing ourselves off to
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as a whole conspires to increase the costs of doing business.71 But the
lawyer as agent also bears risks in the relationship. The client may fail to
pay for the lawyer's services, or the client may exploit the lawyer's exper-
tise or reputation in a fraudulent scheme. To look at agency only from
the principal's perspective ignores the agent's risks.
An agency costs theorist may respond that this is only the flip-side of
the same problem. Choosing to look at the costs of agency only from the
principal's perspective, however, privileges the principal in a manner that
obfuscates the total economic costs of agency. One of the first and most
important contributions in agency costs theory is subtitled The Principal's
Problem. It reveals a bias that tends to focus on the opportunism of
agents rather than principals. Principals may also take advantage of
agents, and these costs of organization should be included in a theory of
the firm.
A. Sharking Defined: Opportunism of Principals Within Firms
Recognizing that agency is a two-way street, J. Gregory Dees urges
"an attempt to correct the biases" in agency theory "by refining and en-
riching principal-agent models" to include the agent's perspective. 7 The
theory of the firm advanced here responds to this concern about the
agent's problem. Like principals, agents face risks in agency relationships.
Trust in agency cuts both ways.
A complete theory of agency and principal costs should expand the
dusty death, about Costs.
ld. at 122.
71. In this regard, Dickens' Bleak House illustrates that there is nothing new about lawyer-
bashing:
The one great principle of English law is, to make business for itself. There is no other
principle distinctly, certainly, and consistently maintained through all its narrow turn-
ings. Viewed by this light it becomes a coherent scheme, and not the monstrous maze
the laity are apt to think it. Let them but once clearly perceive that its grand principle
is to make business for itself at their expense, and surely they will cease to grumble.
DICKENS, supra note 1, at 509; see also Max Radin, The Ancient Grudge: A Study in the Public
Relations of the Legal Profession, 32 VA. L. REV. 734 (1946) (tracing antilawyer sentiment to
classical Greece).
72. See Ross, supra note 51.
73. J. Gregory Dees, Principals, Agents, and Ethics, in ETHICS AND AGENCY THEORY, su-
pra note 51, at 25,49. As Dees observes:
Principal-agent models focus on the principal's problem, from the principal's point of
view. The principal's interests drive the model and determine the shape of the contract
that results. The contract must protect the principal from the agent's opportunism. Yet
it may fail to adequately protect the agent from the principal's opportunism. This can
be a serious problem for prescriptive uses of principal-agent analysis.
Id. "More work should be done," Dees concludes, "on the development of reciprocal principal-
agent models to capture situations in which both sides are vulnerable to opportunism." Ia
Yale Law & Policy Review
vocabulary used to describe different kinds of opportunism in agency re-
lationships. The well-known term shirking characterizes the principal's
problem. Sharking captures the reverse possibility that principals may
take undue advantage of their positions of power and authority to the
detriment of the interests of their agents.
Some economists recognize the costs of opportunism in general to be
important.74 The general concept of opportunism is too broad to be use-
ful in advancing a theory of the firm, however, because it does not distin-
guish between principals and agents. Adding law to the theoretical pic-
ture reveals a long-standing concern with this distinction.5 In addition,
the general problem of opportunism appears outside the boundaries of
the firm as well as inside. Opportunistic behavior occurs in arms-length
bargaining in open-market contracts as well as within the legal agencies
of firms. For an account of organizational costs within firms, the costs of
opportunism in markets must be distinguished from the costs of oppor-
tunism in the agency relationships that compose firms. Broad accounts of
economic opportunism may be useful for other purposes, but the more
limited concepts of shirking and sharking are used here to refer to the
costs of opportunism of agents and principals within firms.
B. Agency Chains: Quasi-Principals and Superior Agents
In addition to the two-way costs of opportunism, agency relationships
in firms also become complex in other ways. Contrary to the simplifying
assumptions of some economic theories that conceive only of principals
and agents, many firms create what may be called agency chains in which
the same individuals may sometimes act as "agents" and sometimes
"principals" depending on the circumstances. Legal theory is more adept
than economics in capturing the nature of these relationships.
74. An account of opportunism figures largely, for example, in the economic theory ad-
vanced by Oliver Williamson. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47-49, 64-67 (1985). He broadly
defines "opportunism" as "self-interest seeking with guile," which includes "more blatant forms,
such as lying, stealing, and cheating" and "more subtle forms of deceit." Id. at 47. Opportunistic
behavior of principals as well as agents also appears in theories that emphasize the "influence
costs" of "individuals within an organization seeking to influence its decisions for their private
benefit." Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organiza-
tion of Economic Activity, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note 18, at 162, 163.
Another account of the perils of opportunism of those acting within the firm is described by the
"'gains of position' that members of the executive group in a corporation may be able to
make[,] ... gains that are not made in fulfillment of the entrepreneurial 'function' but can be
made by those who fill this function." JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 897 n.12 (1954) (quoting ROBERT A. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE
LARGE CORPORATION 272 (1945)).
75. For example, an entire chapter of the Restatement (Second) of Agency is devoted to the
various duties and responsibilities which principals owe to agents, as well as vice versa.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY ch. 14 (1958).
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Consider the following example: A is a chief executive officer, B is a
middle manager, and C is a rank-and-file employee. A acts as an agent of
the firm as a whole but also has the authority of what the Restatement of
Agency calls a "superior agent" with respect to B and C.7' B answers as
an agent with respect to A's authority but acts as a superior agent to C.
Whether an individual in a firm acts with the authority of a "principal" or
answers to others as an "agent" depends on the circumstances and the
relative place of a person in an agency chain.
The most important contemporary example of the ambiguity of prin-
cipal and agent relations in corporations is the chief executive officer and
the chair of the board of directors. Although the two positions are some-
times separated, one person holds both titles in most corporations in the
United States." In this case, the CEO and chair of the board wears "two
hats" as both an agent of the corporation and its de facto principal. On
one hand, the chair of the board is a high-level agent of the corporation
781and its shareholders. On the other, a CEO or president usually exer-
cises powers akin to a principal in having the authority (nominally dele-
gated from the board) to act as the corporation in most ordinary transac-
tions, including most contracts with lower-level employees. In other
words, cases have held that the chief executive of a corporation exercises
"inherent agency power.""
Another example of principal-agent ambiguity is a general partner-
ship in which the partners hire an employee agent.' ° With respect to em-
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.09, cmt., cmt. c, illus. 1 (Preliminary Draft No.
1,1997).
77. See Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 914 & n.85 (1996) (revealing that
more than three-quarters of CEOs in the U.S. also chair the board). In contrast, the two posi-
tions are usually split in Great Britain. See Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britta-
nia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2022
(1994). For a recent recommendation for reform that would require companies listed on the
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ to disclose whether they have a separate chair or
"lead director" of the board, see Constance E. Bagley & Richard H. Koppes, Leader of the
Pack: A Proposal for Disclosure of Board Leadership Structure, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 149
(1997).
78. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ("Directors are agents; they
are fiduciaries.... Those obligations apply with equal force to the humblest agent or broker and
to the director of a great and powerful corporation. They lie at the very foundation of our whole
system of free private enterprise and are as fresh and significant today as when they were first
formulated .... ).
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.08 cmt. (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1997)
("Case law for the most part supports the proposition that a corporation's president (especially
a president who is also the chief executive officer... ) presumptively has powers that may be
exercised independently from the control of the corporation's board of directors.... The power
is inherent in the president's appointment to a particular position."). Id. cmt. b (collecting
cases).
80, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 20 cmt. f (1958) ("A number of persons,
such as members of a partnership, may act jointly in the authorization of an agent ....").
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ployee agents or third parties, each partner acts as a principal. With re-
spect to each other, however, the partners are agents.8 Likewise, it is
common in business enterprise to hire a number of agents who owe fealty
to different principals or owners. 2 The law of agency allows for the




Many of the most powerful individual actors in contemporary society
are characterized in law as agents of others. "In a world thought to be
more egalitarian," writes one scholar, "the agents now governed by cor-
porate law are those who might individually have been principals in pre-
modern eras."'" For these modem princes, including corporate CEOs,
the term quasi-principal may be coined to capture their double lives-
agents for others (their corporations and shareholders) and de facto prin-
cipals who hold vast authority and power.
III. FIRMS AND MARKETS
[T]he broader history of the theory of the firm... reveals the major shaping
role of conjunctions of circumstances that... do not reflect the internal logic
of the subject matter.... Without demeaning the contributions that any of us
have made, I think we must acknowledge that the present state is one of in-
coherence. If we ask, "What does economics have to say about the role of the
business firm in a market economy?" the response will be silence followed by
an excited babble of significantly conflicting answers-an interesting babble,
but a babble nonetheless.86
81. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 301(1) (1994) ("Each partner is an agent of
the partnership for the purpose of its business.").
82- See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 41 (1958) (allowing for the creation
of "joint" principals and agents acting for a "joint account"). For an economic discussion of
"multi-agent models," see Levinthal, supra note 52, at 174-77. These more complex economic
models of agency have not yet been fully developed.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 313 (1958) (stating that a dual agent must be
disclosed to both principals); id. § 14L (discussing the duties of an ambiguous principal). This
legal account casts doubt on recent claims that the law of enterprise organization should always
prevent situations where an agent "serves two masters." The argument is advanced by some
scholars who promote a strict shareholders-only view of the fiduciary duties of corporate man-
agers and directors. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 38 ("[A] manager
told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been
freed of both and is answerable to neither."). "Thou shalt not serve two masters" may be true as
a matter of theology, but not law. Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21
STETSON L. REV. 121, 158 (1991) (quoting Matthew 6:24 (King James)); see also WARREN A.
SEAvEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 147 (1947) ("If a dual agency is disclosed to
both principals, an agent 'can properly represent competing or even antagonistic interests
84. JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP 321 (1995).
85. As in the days of Machiavelli, "prince" remains the operative term. Only a handful of
CEOs of major corporations are women. See, e.g., Kristen Downey Grimsley, Avon Calling...
On a Man, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1997, at G1 (citing statistics from Catalyst, a group that advo-
cates promotion of women in business, that show "top jobs" are "still overwhelmingly male").
86. Sidney G. Winter, On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation, in THE NATURE OF
THE FIRM, supra note 18, at 179.
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From the description of legal agency and agency costs given in Parts I
and II, I turn now to consider other leading economic theories of the firm
in Parts III and IV. From a legal perspective, I discuss what these theo-
ries leave out and what they get wrong. In this Part, I argue that eco-
nomic theories tend to confuse the difference between firms and markets.
Making a distinction between consumer markets for goods and services
and organizational metamarkets of firms avoids this confusion.
A. The Paradox of Methodological Individualism
Most contemporary economic theories proceed on a strong assump-
tion of the individual actor as the unit of analysis. They adhere to
"methodological individualism,"" which asserts that "it is necessary to
base all accounts of economic interaction on individual behavior.""
Although economic theories of the firm have undergone significant
changes in the past few decades, most do not depart substantially from
this assumption. As a result, they have not arrived at a consistent and co-
herent theory of the firm. 9 In particular, economic theories have had dif-
ficulty in describing the boundaries of the firm."
The confusion begins in a failure to recognize that a firm is both an
aggregate of individuals and an entity. On one hand, the firm is an aggre-
gate of individuals who carry on a business together. These individuals
share reciprocal rights and duties within the firm defined by legal rela-
tionships of agency, contract, and property. On the other hand, the firm
is an independent entity that acts in competition with other firms and in-
dividuals. In both economic and legal terms, firms are entities acting in
markets.
87. Id. at 181.
88. Arrow, supra note 12, at 1.
89. See supra text accompanying note 86; see also Bo Gustafson, Foreword to THE FIRM AS
A NEXUS OF TREATIES at vii (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1990) ("It is doubtful if there is yet
general agreement among economists on the subject matter designated by the title 'theory of
the firm' .... ).
90. See, e.g., HART, supra note 18, at 18 ("Principal-agent theory... leaves unresolved the
basic issue of firm boundaries."). One recent contribution has even argued that new information
and communication technology including computers and the internet will result in the "fading"
or "disintegration" of the boundaries of the firm. Arnold Picot et al., The Fading Boundaries of
the Firm: The Role of Information and Communication Technology, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 65, 65-66, 77 (1996). It is true that changing technology in many areas
(and not only information and communications) leads to changes in the organizational structure
of firms and relations among firms. However, organizational change does not mean that firm
boundaries "dissolve" or "disintegrate." Id. at 65-66. Instead, it is more accurate to see the
boundaries of firms changing in response to the economics of changing technologies. As one
commentator remarks, the economic approach to determining the boundaries of the firm would
be improved through "more attention to institutional detail." Ronald J. Gilson, The Fading
Boundaries of the Firm: Comment, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 80, 83 (1996).
In particular, greater legal detail helps to clarify the boundaries of the firm. See infra Part V.
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Economic theory has had difficulty embracing this paradox." In legal
theory as well, the conflict between competing views of firms as aggre-
gates of individuals or entities remains unresolved.9 The treatment of-
fered here sheds light on this debate. The short answer is that firms are
both aggregates of individuals and entities, depending on the question
being asked.93 From the point of view of their internal organization,
firms are aggregates of individuals (with the exception of single-person
firms). From the point of view of the markets in which they act as pur-
chasers and sellers, firms act as entities.
Orthodox economic theory treats business firms exclusively as entities
participating in markets. Like individuals, firms are subject to the "price
mechanism" of markets for their goods and services.94 This conception,
however, presents a "blatant affront" to methodological individualism95
because orthodox economics sees firms as "organizations not individu-
als."96 In other words, the firm is a "black box' '9 or "a monad." 9
91. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 18 (6th ed. 1996) ("Economists... worry about
the question of why activities are sometimes organized across markets and sometimes within the
firm, about what seem to be the most important characteristics of the firm, and about how firms
operate. These issues have proved to be surprisingly intractable.").
92. Whether to consider different kinds of business firms, such as partnerships and corpora-
tions, as entities or aggregates of individuals informs a long tradition of legal debate. An exam-
ple is the debate about the nature of partnerships. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201
(1994) ("A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners."); id. cmt. (discussing
"ambivalence on the nature of partnerships" under the Uniform Partnership Act with respect to
"the entity theory"); A. Ladru Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an
Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 377 (1963); Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Deci-
sions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 427, 428-35 (1991)
(discussing the rationale for "the move to the entity theory" of partnership). For an account of
business organizations that emphasizes the agreements made by an aggregate of individuals as
participants, see, for example, KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 67-68, 108-13. For further
discussion of the entity or personality theories of corporations, see, for example, ALFRED A.
CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 416-45 (1976); John Dewey, The Historic Back-
ground of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); Gregory A. Mark, Comment,
The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441
(1987); and Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (1994).
93. Cf. Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1565, 1567-1612 (1993) (extending H.L.A. Hart's analysis of the corporation along
these lines); cf. also Dewey, supra note 92, at 669 ("As far as the historical survey implies a plea
for anything, it is a plea for disengaging specific issues and disputes which arise from entangle-
ment with any concept of personality which is other than a restatement that such and such rights
and duties, benefits and burdens, accrue and are to be maintained and distributed in such and
such ways, and in such and such situations.").
94. See, e.g., Alchain & Demsetz, supra note 38, at 187, 189. For a seminal treatment of
prices, see Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
95. Winter, supra note 86, at 181.
96. Arrow, supra note 12, at 4.
97. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 52, at 306-07 (describing "black box" theories of the
firm). On the neoclassical economic theory of the firm, see HART, supra note 18, at 15-17.
98. Oliver E. Williamson, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties: An Introduction, in THE FIRM
AS A NEXUS OF TREATIES, supra note 89, at 8.
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In part, the orthodox view is correct. Firms act as entities in the mar-
ket for goods and services because they have the legal authority to do so.
The law of agency and enterprise organization specifically provide for the
creation of this kind of authority. Law enables individuals to bind to-
gether into a firm that has legal personality. A firm organized in any legal
form-whether a partnership, limited liability company, or corporation-
is empowered to bind itself as an entity to third parties in the market.99
Although orthodox economists recognize firms as entities, other
economists maintain that "the ultimate unit of analysis is always the indi-
vidual.""' This methodological commitment leads revisionist economists
to deconstruct the firm into its component parts, namely, its human par-
ticipants. This approach, which informs an analysis based on agency costs
outlined above,'0 ' focuses on the relationships of individuals within firms
rather than firms acting in markets. The role of prices illustrates the dif-
ference between the two perspectives. Unlike the orthodox view that sees
firms subjected to the price mechanism when they participate in mar-
kets,'2 revisionist theories claim that "the distinguishing mark of the firm
is the suppression of the price mechanism."'0 3
Choosing between the orthodox and revisionist economic theories
will not resolve the paradox of the firm, namely, the difference between
individuals composing firms and firms acting in markets. Revisionist
economists dare to look inside the black box of the firm, but they see
only individuals.' Orthodox economists treat firms as entities, but they
do not fully appreciate how law binds individuals together within firms.
Adding legal principles to a theory of the firm resolves the paradox by
showing how both orthodox and revisionist economic theories are cor-
rect, depending on one's perspective. The revisionist view is correct from
the internal perspective within the firm, and the orthodox view is correct
from the external perspective of firms acting in markets. Legal agency
99. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 201 (1995) (describing a partnership as "an
entity distinct from its partners"); id. § 301 (stating that each partner may act to bind the part-
nership); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. Act § 201 (1995) ("A limited liability company is a legal entity
distinct from its members."); id. § 301(a)(1)-(b)(1) (stating that LLC members and managers act
"for the purpose of its business"); REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 3.02 (1984) (stating that
a corporation has "the same powers as an individual" to "carry out its business and affairs").
100. Geoffrey Brennan & Gordon Tullock, An Economic Theory of Military Tactics: Meth-
odological Individualism at War, 3 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 225,225 (1982).
101. See supra Section I.B.
102. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
103. COASE, supra note 17, at 36.
104. Behavioral economics also challenges the orthodox view of firms as entities rather
than as aggregates of individuals. Compare Fritz Machlup, Theories of the Firm: Marginalist,
Behavioral, Managerial, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1967) (defending the neoclassical view of the
firm as an entity for many purposes of economic analysis),'with Richard M. Cyert & Charles L.
Hedrick, Theory of the Firm: Past, Present, and Future; An Interpretation, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 398
(1972) (arguing for a behavioral account of firms through empirical observation).
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enables aggregations of individuals in firms to act as entities in markets
"as if" they were "legal persons."'0' Both orthodox and revisionist eco-
nomic theories are correct because legal agency gives individuals the
power to bind themselves together in firms and allows firms to act as en-
tities in markets.
B. Consumer Markets and Organizational Metamarkets
Legal analysis can resolve the economic paradox of the firm because
it allows for a social theory of the firm rather than one that insists on a
myopic individualism. Legally, firms are social entities found at an inter-
mediate level of organization.'O° On a continuum stretching from sole
proprietorships to large multinational corporations, firms occupy a space
in the social structure between natural individuals and larger collective
entities known as political states. '° Economics explains why individuals
enter and leave firms in pursuit of their own ends. Law explains how in-
dividuals bind themselves together in firms.
With a conception of firms at an intermediate level in society between
autonomous individuals and law-creating states, the paradox of the firm
in economics can be resolved by making a conceptual distinction between
two types of markets: consumer markets and organizational metamar-
kets.'O Firms act as entities competing with each other to supply con-
sumer markets for goods and services. At the same time, firms are aggre-
gates of individuals in how they are organized and change composition in
a constant struggle to create efficient organizational forms.
First, both individuals and firms participate in consumer markets for
goods and services. For example, both individuals and firms purchase le-
gal services. Second, consumer markets are usefully distinguished from
metamarkets that organize production of the goods and services to be
105. See supra Section I.A; cf VINING, supra note 84, at 319-20 (describing corporate law as
involving "the creation of authority in organized activity" and "the recognition of entity"). For
an introduction to the concept of legal personality, see Dewey, supra note 92.
106. Cf. James S. Coleman, Constructed Organization: First Principles, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 7 (1991); Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Gov-
ernance, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 159 (1991). In addition to business firms, there are many other
forms of associations at the level of civil society. For the classic treatment, see 2 ALEXIS DE
TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1948) (1840) (describing
"associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted,
enormous or diminutive"). These associations are outside the scope of this Article.
107. Some business firms have in fact become larger in terms of size and influence than
many political states. For critical discussion, see RICHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH,
GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1994); EDWARD
M. GRAHAM, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS (1996); Eric W. OrtS,
The Legitimacy of Multinational Corporations, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note
27, at 247.
108. On the term "metamarket," see supra note 13.
Vol. 16:265, 1998
Legal Theory of the Firm
sold.'O° Harold Demsetz describes the firm as "a specialized production
unit."'10 Firms in organizational metamarkets respond to the demands of
consumer markets, but they are also subject to other variables, such as
the costs of organization emphasized in revisionist economic theory.
Entities and collections of individuals act in both consumer markets
and organizational metamarkets. In consumer markets, individuals get
together to purchase goods and services. The black box of "the house-
hold" appears at this level.' Cooperative consumer organizations also
act as entities in the consumer market.12 Firms participate as consumers
as well as producers."3 For example, both firms and individuals purchase
legal services. Firms also purchase "inputs" for production. Whether a
firm acts as a consumer or a metamarket producer depends on the cir-
cumstances of a particular transaction, whether the firm is a buyer or
seller."4 For instance, a law firm participates in the consumer market
when it buys paper, computers, and supplies, but it competes in the or-
ganizational metamarket as a supplier of legal services.
This distinction between consumer markets and organizational
metamarkets is not without complications. It does not capture problems
of "in-the-household" production and "on-the-job" consumption.1
5
Unpaid labor, such as housework and in-the-home child care, is not in-
cluded in the production model of organizational metamarkets."6 The
model of consumer markets does not account for "perks" and other
benefits of managers, owners, and employees in firms that are not ac-
counted for in overt compensation payments.1
7
109. Cf. DEMSETZ, supra note 18, at 6-9.
110. Id at 8.
111. Id A household, such as a family, is a group of individuals who live together and make
joint purchases.
112. For an account of the economic importance of "customer-owned enterprise," see
HANSMANN, supra note 8, at 149-223.
113. In this respect, my account of firms as entities that act as consumers as well as produc-
ers differs from Demsetz's view. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
114. One commentator on an early version of this Article said that this theory of the firm
bears a resemblance to theories of light in physics: Whether light is a particle or a wave depends
on how one looks at the issue. Similarly, a firm acts as a consumer when it purchases goods or
services and as a producer when it makes and sells them. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Computer Media
for the Legal Profession, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2058, 2084 (1996) ("Most laypeople, very much in-
cluding me, would be out of place at a physicists' conference, where we'd probably say things
like 'Light is a particle and a wave? That makes no sense!' Law can be as technical as phys-
ics .... ).
115. DEMSETZ, supra note 18, at 8.
116. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation.: Family Law and the Romance of
Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989 (1995); Katherine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into
Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1996).
117. Demsetz distinguishes between two types of on-the-job consumption: "explicitly nego-
tiated on-the-job consumption" which is accounted for within the firm's compensation structure
and "implicit" on-the-job consumption which is not. DEMSETZ, supra note 18, at 24-25.
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The distinction between consumer markets and organizational
metamarkets is nevertheless useful because it clarifies the second-order
level of competition among different business forms. Organizational
metamarkets respond to the demand in consumer markets, but other fac-
tors also affect them. The structure of the metamarket of firms is deter-
mined not only by the prices of factors of production, but also by vari-
ables difficult to quantify, such as savings on organizational costs (agency
and principal costs), 118 transaction costs,"9 specialization,' 2 the organi-
zation of technical knowledge and information,12 ' and economies of scale
and scope.122
Business firms exist to supply the needs of consumer markets for
goods and services. This answers an initial problem in economic analysis
to explain why firms exist. Why do people band together in organizations
if they tend to be selfish and serve themselves? The answer is that signifi-
cant economic gains can be obtained from coordinated specialization and
teamwork within legal structures of agency relationships.'2
The distinction between consumer markets and organizational
metamarkets allows for clarification of the different kinds of business
firms. At one extreme, a single individual entrepreneur may compete in
the organizational metamarket. An example is an individual lawyer
equipped with his or her own personal computer and other supplies.
Without a partner, secretary, or paralegal, the sole practitioner may
118. See supra Parts I, II.
119. Transaction costs may be defined as the costs of markets when using the price mecha-
nism. These costs include negotiating, contracting, and the opportunity costs of not being able to
focus on doing something else. For further discussion of transaction costs theories of the firm,
see infra Section IV.A.
120. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. For a leading treatment of specialization of
risk-taking and management, see KNIGHT, supra note 58, chs. 8 & 9.
121. See Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities,
and the Replication of Technology, 3 ORG. Sci. 383,396 (1992) (describing the firm as "a reposi-
tory of capabilities"); Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and
Learning, 7 ORG. SCI. 502, 503 (1996) (describing the firm as "a social community specializing
in the speed and efficiency in the creation and transfer of knowledge"). For a recent economic
account that emphasizes access to information as an important source of power within the firm,
see Aghion & Tirole, supra note 11.
122. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM 17 (1990) (defining "economies of scale" as "those that result when the increased
size of a single operating unit producing or distributing a single product [or service] reduces the
unit costs of production or distribution" and "economies of scope" as "economies of joint pro-
duction or distribution" that result "from the use of processes within a single operating unit to
produce or distribute more than one product [or service]").
123. See supra notes 29, 58, 118-122 and accompanying text. Some theories of the firm,
however, then go on to ask why specialization and team production should be coordinated
within firms rather than across markets. In other words, specialists could exist independently
and coordinate production through a series of market transactions that do not cohere into a
firm. Theories that emphasize transaction costs and the organization of technical knowledge in
firms provide helpful analysis along these lines. See supra notes 119, 121 and accompanying
text; see also infra Part IV (discussing economic theories of the firm).
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compete with other more complex law firms to provide legal services to
consumers. This "one-person unit" qualifies as a firm because it com-
petes in the metamarket of production of legal services.Y A one-person
business, according to this approach, qualifies as the simplest type of
firm, which is called a pure sole proprietorship. Larger firms including
partnerships and corporate groups also compete in organizational
metamarkets.125
This approach resolves the paradox of firms and markets. As an en-
tity, the firm participates in consumer markets. As an aggregate of indi-
viduals, the firm competes in organizational metamarkets with other
firms to supply consumer markets. Firms as entities and aggregates com-
peting in markets and metamarkets describe two sides of the same eco-
nomic coin.
IV. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF THE FIRM
The economic literature on theories of the firm has grown enormous,
and it is not possible to do justice to all the various approaches here.
However, it is useful to classify economic theories of the firm into four
types that emphasize transaction costs, contracts, property, and employ-
ment. Each of them is briefly reviewed through a legal lens.
A. Transaction Costs
The original version of a transaction costs theory of the firm is given
by Ronald Coase. He claims broadly that firms exist because the mecha-
nisms of market trading are not free. In other words, firms exist because
people engaged in business may in some circumstances save transaction
costs (such as negotiating, drafting contracts, and other costs of using
markets) by internalizing production within a single organizational
form."" When the costs of transacting business across markets exceed
the costs of organizing the same transactions within firms, then firms exist
and will increase in size as long as an economic differential can be real-
ized.I" Agency and principal costs, both shirking and sharking, impose
124. DEMSETZ, supra note 18, at 9.
125. The different kinds of firms are canvassed below in Part V.
126. See COASE, supra note 17, at 35-36 ("Outside the firm, price movements direct produc-
tion, which is co-ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a
firm these market transactions are eliminated, and in place of the complicated market structure
with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who directs produc-
tion."); see also Robert Flannigan, The Economic Structure of the Firm, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
105, 113-17 (1995).
127. The difference between the costs of markets and firms is not readily identifiable, how-
ever, because there is no market "price" for the transaction costs of markets. See supra note 103
and accompanying text.
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organization costs on firms. An economic equilibrium results between the
transaction costs of markets and the organization costs of firms.'
Oliver Williamson further develops the concept of transaction costs. 29
His project is to "operationalize" Coase's theory of the firm.' 3 Because
Williamson adopts a "contractual approach," his transaction costs theory
is closely related to the contractarian theories of the firm that I discuss
next.' According to Williamson, the firm is "a governance structure
rather than a production function."'3 2 By governance structure, he means
one version or another of an explicit or implicit contract.'
Despite his use of the concepts of governance and contracts, however,
Williamson does not develop a sophisticated legal account of firms in
tandem with his complex economic theory. 34 Little of the law of agency
128. This equilibrium in transaction costs theory corresponds to my distinction between
consumer markets and organizational metamarkets of firms described supra Section III.B.
129. See Flannigan, supra note 126, at 122 (describing Williamson's work as "a capacious
analytical framework purporting to have application to a variety of diverse phenomena").
130. Id. at 121 (citing Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Market Production:
Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971), and Oliver E. Williamson, Mar-
kets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 316 (1973)).
131. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: FIRMS, MARKETS AND POLICY
CONTROL 174 (1986) ("Transaction economics adopts a contractual approach to the study of
economic organization.").
132. Oliver E. Williamson, Economics and Organizations: A Primer, CAL. MGMT. REV.,
Winter 1996, at 131, 131, 133 (describing the view of the firm in traditional neoclassical theory
as a "production function" and the view derived from transaction costs as a "governance struc-
turef"). As described above, Demsetz sees the firm rather as "a specialized production unit."
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 74, at 43-84 (discussing views of "contractual man"
and "the governance of contractual relations"). For an introduction to Williamson's theory, see
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 3-20, 54-87, 219-49, 349-75
(1996); Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 65,
66-67, 72-88 (1988); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance: Framework and Im-
plications, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 195 (1984).
134. Williamson's economic theory cannot be summarized here. There are several basic
concepts, however, which are important in his theory of the firm. First, like theorists of agency
costs, Williamson emphasizes the costs of opportunism in firms. See supra note 74 (giving Wil-
liamson's definition of opportunism); see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 74, at 64-67 (discussing
the importance of opportunism in economic organization). This open-ended concept is consis-
tent with the analysis of shirking and sharking developed above. See supra Section I.B & Part II.
Second, following Herbert Simon, Williamson highlights bounded rationality and uncertainty as
factors influencing the choice of individuals to create and join in firms. See, e.g, Williamson, su-
pra note 98, at 11-12 (citing HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1961));
Williamson, The Economics of Governance, supra note 133, at 203-06. Firms are useful because
"human beings are limited in knowledge, foresight, skill, and time." Williamson, supra note 98,
at 11 (quoting SIMON, supra, at 199). Third, Williamson develops the concept of asset specificity,
which refers to the tendency of investments in property and human skills to become tied to a
particular firm. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 74, at 52-56 (describing different kinds of asset
specificity and emphasizing that "the importance of asset specificity to transaction cost eco-
nomics is difficult to exaggerate"); Williamson, supra note 98, 11-12 (defining asset specificity as
"the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users
without sacrifice of productive value"). As discussed below, asset specificity refers to the impor-
tant role of ownership and property rights in firms. See infra Section IV.C and Part V. Together,
these elements of transaction costs, opportunism, bounded rationality, and asset specificity help
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or enterprise organization appears in his voluminous work.13 For exam-
ple, in his treatment of corporations, Williamson notes only two "key le-
gal features"-limited liability and the transferability of ownership in
shares-and then moves on.'36 "Failure to discuss them [as well as other
legal principles] does not," he says, "reflect a judgment that they are ei-
ther irrelevant or uninteresting." '137 More than this, I believe including a
more comprehensive understanding of law-especially the law of agency
and business forms-would clarify and strengthen Williamson's theory
because it is precisely the availability of legal organizational forms that
enables the transaction costs of markets to be saved. Firms are creatures
of law as well as transaction costs.
B. Contracts
Transaction costs theory also shares a fault of another theory that
employs a simple model of the firm as involving mostly contracts.
"Contractual relations are the essence of the firm," according to this in-
fluential theory,'38 and the "firm is simply one form of legal fiction which
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships."'39 From a legal perspec-
tive, however, the view that "all relationships that make up a firm are
to explain the economic nature of firms.
For a recent debate about transaction costs theory, compare Sumantra Ghoshal & Pe-
ter Moran, Bad for Practice: A Critique of Transaction Cost Theory, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 48
(1996), with Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Organization: The Case for Candor, 21 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 48 (1996). Ghoshal and Moran argue that Williamson's theory is open to criticism
on the same grounds as other theories that pursue an approach of methodological individualism.
See supra Section III.A. Ghoshal and Moran open their argument with the following joke:
In business circles, a story is often told of two hikers who wake up one night to find a
tiger lurking near their tent. One of the hikers immediately reaches for his running
shoes. On being reminded by his partner that he could not possibly outrun the tiger,
he responds that all he has to do is to outrun his partner.
Ghoshal & Moran, supra, at 13. Williamson responds that such "toy problems" are not con-
vincing, but he seems to miss the point when he answers that hikers should think about whom to
go hiking with beforehand and go only with those with "good" reputations. Williamson, Eco-
nomic Organization, supra, at 53-54.
135. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 133, at 10, 57,
333 (demonstrating a truncated view of contract law and failing to refer to legal agency princi-
ples).
136. WILLIAMSON, supra note 74, at 274.
137. Id.
138. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 52, at 310.
139. ld. at 311. These theorists note that the firm "is characterized by the existence of di-
visible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be
sold without permission of the other contracting individuals." Id. at 311 (emphasis omitted).
This observation relates to the "property rights" view of the firm discussed below. See infra Sec-
tion IV.C. These theorists also note: "By legal fiction we mean the artificial construct under the
law which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals." Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 52, at 310 n.12. This comment relates to legal ideas of "entity" and "personality," but the
economists do not develop a sophisticated view of this "fiction" that through legal recognition
has a very real existence. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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'contractual' is wrong.'4 Among other things, asserting that business
firms are essentially contractual obscures the importance of legal
agency.41
Contractarian theorists recognize implicitly that contract law is insuf-
ficient to account for agency authority in firms when they refer to
"implicit,"1 42 "incomplete,"' 43 or even "non-binding"144 contracts. Al-
though this loose conception of contracts may prove useful for some
forms of economic analysis, it is imprecise from a legal perspective.
14
Vague references to implicit or incomplete contracts often substitute for
a proper recognition of a different kind of legal relationship, namely
agency. Implicit or incomplete contracts also often refer to normative
agreements or ethical obligations that are not legally enforceable as con-
tracts. At the least, this use of the concept of "contracts" in economics is
confusing.
Scott Masten criticizes the broad use of the term "contract" in eco-
140. Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPLES AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 61 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991). Ac-
cording to Clark, the contractarian view is "extreme," "almost perverse," and "likely to blind
us" to the features of firms that are most "distinctive, puzzling, and worth exploring." ld. at 60.
For criticism of the legal adoption of contractarian economic theory along similar lines, see
William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L.
REV. 180 (1992); William W. Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs,
and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?:
Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53
BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988).
141. For example, Jensen and Meckling recognize the "important role which the legal sys-
tem and the law play in social organizations," but they do not fully appreciate its complexity
when they describe this role largely in terms of contracts. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 52, at
311 n.14.
Statutory laws sets [sic] bounds on the kinds of contract into which individuals and or-
ganizations may enter without risking criminal prosecution. The police powers of the
state are available and used to enforce performance of contracts or to enforce the col-
lection of damages for non-performance. The courts adjudicate conflicts between con-
tracting parties and establish precedents which form the body of common law. All of
these government activities affect both the kinds of contracts executed and the extent
to which contracting is relied upon. This in turn determines the usefulness, productiv-
ity, profitability and viability of various forms of organization. Moreover, new laws as
well as court decisions often can and do change the rights of contracting parties ex
post, and they can and do serve as a vehicle for redistribution of wealth.
Id. In this account, note the almost exclusive focus on contracts as if all other law were only a
gloss on contracts.
142. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 12 (referring to the corporation as "a set
of implicit and explicit contracts").
143. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 133, at 9-10, 56, 131
(referring to "incomplete contracts").
144. Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Intra-Firm Bargaining Under Non-Binding Contracts,
63 REV. ECON. STUDIES 375, 375-77 (1996) (referring to "non-binding contracts" in employ-
ment-at-will bargaining).
145. As Clark observes, using the term "contracts" in this sense is "metaphorical" rather
than legally descriptive. Clark, supra note 140, at 61.
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nomic theories of the firm.146 Recognizing that lawyers use the term con-
tract more restrictively than economists, he recommends an expanded
consideration of the true "legal basis for the firm." 147 "Ironically," he
notes, "economists have either downplayed or rejected outright the role
of the law in defining the firm.' 48 It is even more ironic that many legal
academics uncritically embrace contractarian theories of the firm. The
fervor of their attachment may justify an ideological label of
"contractarianism,' '149 and Victor Brudney may correctly identify their
146. Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 184 (1988).
147. Il at 181. As Masten notes, most lawyers mean "contract" to refer to "a formal, legal
commitment to which each party gives express approval and to which a particular body of law
applies." Id. at 184. Masten argues that agency relationships in employment should be recog-
nized as central in a theory of the firm. See id. at 185-94. In this Article, I agree with Masten but
extend his approach to include other agency relationships in addition to employment. See infra
Part V.
148. Id. at 185 (citing Jensen & Meckling, supra note 52, at 310-11, referring to the firm as a
"legal fiction").
149. For an expression of a leading contractarian account of corporate law, see
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 12 ("[W]e often speak of the corporation as a
'nexus of contracts' or a set of implicit and explicit contracts. This reference.., is shorthand for
the complex arrangements of many sorts that those who associate voluntarily in the corporation
will work out among themselves."); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) ("The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts,
and corporate law enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many dif-
ferent sets of risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy."). For critical re-
views of their approach, see Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Cor-
porate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 2215 (1992) (book review essay); Lawrence E. Mitchell,
The Cult of Efficiency, 71 TEx. L. REV. 217 (1992) (book review). For a critical review within
the law-and-economics tradition, see Robert M. Daimes & Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law
Paradox: The Case for Restructuring Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 577 (1992) (book review
essay); see also sources cited supra note 140.
Another recent approach refers to the firm as a "network of contracts." Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
This approach does not "question the usefulness of contractual metaphor in characterizing the
firm." Id. at 765. It seeks only to expand the metaphor to include "network externalities," which
have been argued to be important in product markets. Iii at 763 & n.15 (citing sources in the
economics literature). Like agency costs, network externalities help to explain the boundaries of
firms, but they do not account for the basic legal machinery that creates firms themselves. For a
criticism of the use of the "network" concept in legal analysis, see Richard M. Buxbaum, Is
"Network" a Legal Concept?, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 698 (1993).
Yet another alternative focuses on the "bargains" made among the actual individual
participants in firms. William Klein gives the leading account of a bargaining theory of the firm.
See Klein, supra note 20, at 1521 (describing a "series-of-bargains model" of "the economic ar-
rangements of a firm"). One recent variation of this theory uses agency costs "as a spring-
board." Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540,
550 (1995) (expanding on Klein's bargaining theory). However, most bargaining theories of the
firm remain tied to an essentially contractarian model of the firm, which is expanded meta-
phorically (like other contractarian models) to refer to "implicit, tacit bargaining." Utset, supra,
at 584. Bargaining theories therefore remain incomplete. A focus on contractual bargaining
tends to emphasize the role of individual participants at the expense of relationships of author-
ity that allow firms to act as entities in markets. See supra Parts I, III.
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motivation as political. 50 More charitably, the simplicity of contractarian
theory may seduce those who are strongly influenced by an individualis-
tic view of the world.' Contractarian theories overemphasize contracts
and oversimplify the law, however, because they do not account for or-
ganizational complexity and its legal foundations in agency relationships
of authority, power, and hierarchy. 52
Interestingly, this mistake is not made by Ronald Coase, the progeni-
tor of economic theories of the firm. In The Nature of the Firm, Coase
draws directly on principles of agency law.'53 Adding law to the theoreti-
cal mix does not detract from the economic reasons firms come into exis-
tence. As discussed above, these reasons include transaction costs, spe-
cialization, organization of knowledge and information, and the ability of
firms to achieve economies of scale and scope.'m Firms are flexible in
"deciding what to do and how to do it."'55 If the motivation for creating
firms is economic, however, the mechanism by which firms are estab-
lished is legal. Coase recognizes the importance of legal agency when he
writes that the "best approach" to "what constitutes a firm in practice" is
to consider "the legal relationship normally called that of 'master and
servant' or 'employer and employee.""56 For Coase, "it is the fact of di-
rection which is the essence of the legal concept" of the firm."7
150. See Brudney, supra note 140, at 1404 (noting that a contractarian theory of the firm
"serves the ideological function of legitimating substantially unaccountable managerial discre-
tion").
151. A contractarian worldview comports with the neoclassical economic starting point of a
world of individuals competing in markets. Contracts specify the transactions among the indi-
viduals. The world of enterprise organization and its legal structure, however, cannot be de-
scribed so easily in terms of "simple rules." See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A
COMPLEX WORLD 247 (1995) ("On internal corporate matters, the sound approach only re-
quires using the standard common law rules of property, contract, and tort."). For criticism of
Epstein's "simple rules," see Heidi Li Feldman, Law and Economics; Libertarianism with a
Twist, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1883 (1996) (book review); Eric W. Orts, Simple Rules and the Perils of
Reductionist Legal Thought, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1441 (1995) (book review).
152. See supra Section I.A and infra Part V.
153. Coase begins with the following question: Given neoclassical economic assumptions
about efficient markets, "why is there any organization?" COASE, supra note 17, at 36. Why
does the economist look at the world and find "'islands of conscious power in this ocean of un-
conscious cooperation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk?.' Id. at 35
(quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1925)). As discussed in the text, the
answers lie in the legal mechanisms of agency and enterprise law.
154. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
155. COASE, supra note 17, at 49 (quoting KNIGHT, supra note 58, at 268).
156. COASE, supra note 17, at 53-54. The importance of employment in theories of the firm
is also discussed infra Section IV.D.
157. Id. In later reflections on The Nature of the Firm, Coase agrees with economists who
say "the firm is essentially a choice of contractual arrangements." Ronald H. Coase, The Nature
of the Firm: Meaning, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note 18, at 56. However, he empha-
sizes that contracts are "greatly reduced" in firms "by the use of a special kind of contract" and
recalls that these special contracts "correspond closely to the legal concept of the relationship of
employer and employee." Id. Coase credits this insight about the importance of agency rela-
tionships to FRANCIS R. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1929), which he studied
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In a footnote in The Nature of the Firm, Coase recognizes also-
though somewhat vaguely-that the employer-employee relationship is
not the only important agency relationship in firms. In addition, the
property and financing of the firm are critical.158 Later theorists pick up
on the importance of property, ownership, and the financing of the firm.
They develop the property theories of the firm discussed next. The point
here is to emphasize that Coase recognized the importance of legal
agency in his original theory of the firm, though he did not spell it out
precisely.159
C. Property
Economic theories of the firm that emphasize property focus on the
control of employment relationships enabled by ownership. They point
out the weakness of contractarian theories in explaining the center of
gravity of a firm and argue that the ownership of property in the firm
should be seen as fundamental. A leading version of a property theory of
the firm is given by Oliver Hart.lW According to Hart, "the firm's non-
human assets.., represent the glue that holds the firm together.. 6
Without property, "the firm is just a phantom." 2 Firms arise where con-
tractual relationships fail and "where the allocation of power and control
is therefore important."' 63 Hart criticizes contractarian theories for fail-
in "one of my law courses at LSE," thus providing an object-lesson in favor of interdisciplinary
studies of law by economists and vice versa. Coase, supra, at 56.
158. See COASE, supra note 17, at 53 n.48 ("The legal concept of 'employer and employee'
and the economic concept of a firm are not identical in that the firm may imply control over
another person's property as well as over their labor.").
159. It is interesting also to note that Coase's article had "little or no influence for thirty or
forty years after it was published," and its initial reception was "complete lack of interest." R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note 18, at 61;
see also Bruce Kogut, Book Review, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 503 (1993) (stating that "it took 40 years
before the economics profession seriously returned" to Coase's question concerning why firms
exist). Perhaps recovering an understanding of Coase's original emphasis of legal as well as
economic principles in his theory of the firm has required a similar period of gestation.
160. See HART, supra note 18, at 29-72; see also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, The
Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON.
691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL
ECON. 1119 (1990); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on Theories of the Firm, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989). For other theories emphasizing a property approach, see
STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 317-79 (1990) (advancing a theory of corpora-
tions as an extension of theories of property); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Quasi-Rent Structure of
Corporate Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory, 44 EMORY L.J. 1277 (1995) (extending the
"measurement branch" of transaction costs theory, which emphasizes a property-rights ap-
proach, to advance a financial valuation theory of firms).
161. HART, supra note 18, at 57.
162 Id.
163. Id. at 1. For a recent economic approach that usefully expands on the importance of
power and the access to power enabled by property rights of ownership in the firm, see Rajan &
Zingales, supra note 11.
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ing to explain "the source of an employer's authority over an em-
ployee,"'" and he emphasizes that "control over nonhuman assets leads
to control over human assets.' 161 Ownership of capital assets puts a per-
son in a position to organize production through the purchase of eco-
nomic factors, including labor.1
6
The property theory of the firm represents an advance from contrac-
tarian theories. Property or capital explains the economic leverage re-
quired for the creation of relationships of authority in firms, usually
through contracts. Only through legal agency, however, is the nature of
these relationships fully explained. Residual control rights are ordinarily
retained by the holders of equity ownership interests in the firm.167
Property theorists recognize that residual rights may be delegated within
a firm according to law, for example, from equity shareholders to the
board of directors in a corporation.'68 This analysis does not go far
enough, however, to account for the importance of legal mechanisms in
creating firms.
Like economists who focus too closely on contracts in firms, property
theorists emphasize the rights of "ownership" and downplay other legal
relationships.'69 In fact, firms are a complex mixture of contracts and
property, and the mixture coheres through the law of agency and enter-
prise organization. Both contractarian and property rights theories are
important for understanding the economic and legal nature of the firm.
Standing alone, however, neither theory offers a complete picture. A le-
gal theory of the firm shows how agency, contracts, and property work
together.
D. Employment
As discussed above, Ronald Coase recognizes that employment con-
164. HART, supra note 18, at 57.
165. Id. at 58 (emphasis omitted).
166. This point is related to Williamson's emphasis of asset specificity in firms. See supra
note 134.
167. "According to the property rights approach," Hart writes, "the owner of an asset has
residual control rights over that asset: the right to decide all usages of the asset in any way not
inconsistent with prior contract, custom, or law." HART, supra note 18, at 30. On the importance
of "the residual control argument" and its relationship to human capital and controlling oppor-
tunism within firms, see Flannigan, supra note 126, at 125-31.
168. See HART, supra note 18, at 30 n.3. Depending on economic and social circumstances,
equity ownership in a firm may be held primarily by employees or customers, as well as inves-
tors. For an interesting analysis along these lines, see HANSMANN, supra note 8, at 66-119, 149-
81.
169. For example, Hart relies on Oliver Wendell Holmes's definition of "ownership" but
overlooks Holmes's work in agency law. See HART, supra note 18, at 30 n.4 (citing OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 193 (1963)). For a discussion of Holmes's writings on
agency see supra note 34 and accompanying text (referring to Holmes's writings on agency).
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stitutes an essential element that distinguishes firms from markets.170
Employment is not present in all kinds of firms. There are one-person
firms and multiple-person partnerships without employees.17' The vast
majority of firms, however, use employment agency relationships.
A growing number of economists focus on the employment dimen-
sion of firms from a microeconomic perspective.72 In addition, various
methods of profit-sharing and employee ownership are increasingly seen
as important in the productivity of firms."3 Theorists also emphasize the
importance of "human capital" invested in a firm's employees and risks
borne by them. 74
Employment theories of the firm differ widely in their prescriptions
for how employees should be treated within firms. Some commentators
advocate employee representation in managerial decisionmaking, in-
170. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text. Scott Masten also makes this point.
See supra note 147.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 124-125 and infra Sections V.A, V.B.
172. See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 38, at 121-24 (emphasizing "team produc-
tion"); Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Contested Exchange: New Microfoundations for the
Political Economy of Capitalism, 18 POL. & SOc'Y 165, 167 (1990) (arguing that "contested ex-
change" between labor and capital "gives rise to a well-defined set of power relations among
voluntarily participating agents" in firms); Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm as an
Incentive System, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 972 (1994) (offering principal-agent model examining
employment incentives); Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multi-Task Principal-Agent
Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991)
(same); Harvey Liebenstein, The Prisoners' Dilemma in the Invisible Hand An Analysis of In-
trafirm Productivity, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 92 (1982) (examining legal and non-legal
"conventions" for worker productivity); Louis Putterman, Ownership and the Nature of the
Firm, 17 J. CoMP. ECON. 243, 244 (1993) (focusing on the "separation of ownership and work"
as "the basic cause of the familiar agency problem between employer and employee").
Note that my distinction between consumer markets and organizational metamarkets,
see supra Section III.B, does not conflict with a large and important body of scholarship that
analyzes "internal labor markets" within firms. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wa-
chter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913
(1996) (focusing on norms of internal labor markets and the law of employment); Oliver Wil-
liamson et al., Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange,
6 BELL J. ECON. 250 (1975) (examining "internal labor markets" in firms). The laws of eco-
nomics are not suspended within firms and apply to employment as well as goods and services.
This analytical approach to employment, however, is not my focus here.
173. See, e.g., PAYING FOR PRODUCrIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE (Alan S. Blinder
ed., 1990) (collecting essays on incentive pay structures, profit-sharing, employee ownership,
and other approaches to increasing employee productivity within firms); see also supra note 37
(listing sources on employee ownership and participation in governance of firms).
174. See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 238 ("Employees ... inevitably
bear many of the risks associated with certain kinds of investments, especially investments in
'human capital.' Hence, when investments in highly specialized human capital are important to
the way that a firm creates wealth, employees.., are likely to be residual claimants and, there-
fore, residual risk-bearers."); O'Connor, supra note 37, at 965 (arguing that concern with human
capital and efficiency in firms should drive reform of corporate and labor law). For a general
treatment distinguishing between firm-specific and general human capital, see GARY S.
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 19-20, 26 (2d ed.
1975).
Yale Law & Policy Review
cluding representation on corporate boards of directors, 75 and others ar-
gue for broadening fiduciary duties of employers to include employees."6
Most argue for the status quo of employment contracts with some con-
straints imposed by statutes.IV At a minimum, scholars who examine the
role of employees in firms have established that this relationship is a key
component of any viable theory of the firm. In the theory of the firm ad-
vanced here, employment is included as a necessary element.
V. A LEGAL THEORY OFTHE FIRM AND ITS BOUNDARIES
The introduction of insights grounded in microeconomic analysis has en-
hanced the intellectual rigor of corporate legal scholarship. The complexity
of the behavior and organizations to which corporate law lends formal legal
structure belies the explanatory force of any one intellectual discipline, how-
ever .... As a result, although the theoretical future might look less tidy than
some would wish, its longevity will be enhanced. In short, like a shark, corpo-
rate law scholarship requires motion for its survival.
17 8
Deborah DeMott's estimation of the merits of economic analysis is
179confirmed by the analysis of theories of the firm presented above.
These theories are complex, untidy, and often conflicting, yet they have
explanatory force. This Part advances a legal theory of the firm intended
to complement these various economic theories1 s It pulls together dis-
175. See, e.g., J.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE
THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 397-434 (1993) (arguing for a "democratic imperative" of em-
ployee participation in corporate decisionmaking); RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION 118-76 (1976) (arguing for "constituency directors" including representatives of
employees). Some European states have legislated a requirement for employee representation
on corporate boards or "codetermination." See Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on Corpo-
rate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Integration in Europe, 14
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1994); Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: Euro-
pean Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338
(1984).
176. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 227, 248-52, 255-70
(1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 630-39 (1992); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring
the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189, 1234 (1991); Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21
STETSON L. REV. 45,47,70-71 (1991).
177. Statutory restrictions include prohibitions on employment discrimination on the basis
of age, ethnicity, religion, sex, or sexual orientation, as well as recognition of rights of employ-
ees to organize themselves in unions for collective bargaining. See also infra note 222 and ac-
companying text.
178. Deborah A. DeMott, Trust and Tension Within Corporations, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
1308, 1337 (1996) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995)).
179. See supra Parts I-IV.
180. This approach accords with recommendations from several leading academics in both
law and economics. Robert Clark argues that a "closer focus on actual rather than presumed
legal doctrines and concepts might do much to refine our current theory of the firm." Clark, su-
pra note 140, at 55. Similarly, Harold Demsetz and Scott Masten agree that legal analysis may
help to clarify the confusion among economic theories. See Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the
Vol. 16:265, 1998
Legal Theory of the Firm
parate economic elements within a legal understanding, and outlines the
boundaries of "what a firm is and what it is not. 181
Firms of more than one person are better described not as a nexus of
contracts, but as a nexus of agency relationships. In the language of con-
tractarian theory, saying that the firm is a nexus of contracts leads one to
ask: What creates the nexus? Only a legal theory of the firm can answer
the question: agency and the legal recognition of specific forms of organi-
zation.'"
Individuals with different skills and resources fill different roles within
economic organizations. The analysis that follows distinguishes three
specialized roles in firms: control, ownership, and employment. These at-
tributes of the firm combine insights gained from economic theories-
including the importance of contracts, property, and employment-with
a recognition of the essential mechanisms of legal agency that establish
relationships of authority and power.3 In these terms, I describe a num-
ber of types of firms ranging from the pure sole proprietorship to the re-
lational firm of a large corporate group. In each case, I also discuss the
legal boundaries of the firm,'m which appear against the background of
competitive markets in which firms act... and shift according to the ques-
tion being asked."6 In general, the boundaries of the firm are drawn
along the lines of control, ownership, and employment.
Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 155 (1988) ("[Economists] have no clear notion of
firm-like contractual arrangements, especially since we now recognize the difficulty of distin-
guishing between coordination achieved 'across markets' and coordination achieved 'within
firms.' It might be useful to adopt legal notions of what a firm is and what it is not."); Masten,
supra note 146, at 181 (arguing that a "legal basis for the firm" should be pursued).
181. Demsetz, supra note 180, at 155.
182. Another conceptual approach to contracts within firms that is consistent with the
nexus-of-agencies analysis focuses on the "legal personality" created by the recognition of the
ability of "the firm" to enter various contracts with its participants, including its owners, manag-
ers, employees, suppliers, distributors, customers, and others. See supra notes 92-93, 105 and
accompanying text (discussing legal personality and collecting sources). This approach is not
purely contractarian because the legal recognition of "the firm" as an abstract "entity" or
"person" with the capacity to enter contracts and own property requires a different kind of law,
namely, the law of agency and enterprise organization. I thank Henry Hansmann for e-mail cor-
respondence which recommended this alternative approach.
183. See supra Section L.A and Part III. Another scholar describes control as "the essential
defining attribute of the firm." Flannigan, supra note 126, at 106. Emphasizing legal conceptions
of control, however, should not ignore economic reality and complex structures of
"specialization, diversification, and discretion." Klein, supra note 20, at 1544. The synthesis of-
fered here balances an account of the legal authority and control necessary to create firms with
an appreciation of the economic complexity of ownership and employment patterns. See infra
Figure 1 at page 313 (illustrating the vertical dimension of agency authority and the horizontal
dimension of ownership in firms).
184. As in other areas of law, the conceptual boundaries of the firm are important. See su-
pra note 16 and accompanying text.
185. See supra Part III.
186. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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A. Control: Enterprise-Organizing and the Sole Proprietor
In the beginning, for a legal theory of the firm in free societies, is the• . 187
enterprise-organizer. Once an economic, legal, and political system has
been established that recognizes a free market in enterprise organization
as well as goods and services, each person becomes able to go into busi-
ness independently-at least in theory. 8 In practice, one also needs the
skill or good fortune to have the necessary capital. Given the economic
means, each individual has the legal capacity to act as a firm (or to join
one) as well as to be an individual consumer."8 9 One person acting as the
enterprise-organizer is a sole proprietor."9 o
If the sole proprietor acts alone without any employees, partners, or
financial contributors, then the legal enterprise may be called a pure sole
proprietorship. It combines the functions of a business in one individual.
It is self-directed, self-owned, self-employed, and self-financed. A pure
sole proprietorship is a unique type of firm because it does not involve an
internal agency relationship. With neither legal agency nor agency costs,
it is an exception to the rule that firms are composed of agencies. 9' It
makes sense to include pure sole proprietorships as firms, however, be-
187. The term "enterprise-organizer" is adapted from CONARD ET AL., supra note 3. Coase
refers instead to the "entrepreneur-coordinator." COASE, supra note 17, at 58. Similarly, Al-
chian and Demsetz refer to "entrepreneur-organizer." Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 38, at
140 n.14. I prefer enterprise-organizer because the term is broader. The term encompasses man-
agers as well as entrepreneurs, and it covers the general responsibility of organizing a business,
including not only coordinating and overseeing, but also reorganizing the entire structure of a
firm. See infra Subsection VI.B.4 (discussing "financial reengineering").
188. Some societies with a tradition of state socialism, such as those in Eastern Europe,
have found this basic principle difficult to accept. For example, an early proposal for post-
revolutionary Russian law would have required every business, no matter what the legal form
and including sole proprietorships, to register with the state. See American Bar Association,
Central and East European Law Initiative, Analysis of Draft Law of the Russian Federation on
Business and Business Activity (Mar. 29, 1993) (appendix, comment of Eric W. Orts, Mar. 22,
1993). Thankfully, this approach was abandoned. Cf. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A
Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996) (describing new ver-
sion of Russia's corporate statute drafted by the authors).
189. This freedom to organize as well as to consume parallels the conceptual distinction
between organizational metamarkets and consumer markets introduced above in Section III.B.
190. A familiar example of an enterprise-organizer is the child who sets up a lemonade
stand. See Theresa Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Lim-
ited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1388-89 (1992). Supplies are
provided by a well-meaning parent. But the enterprise, that is, the making of the lemonade,
marketing it with a sign, serving it to customers, and making money from the sales-all of the
basic business functions that can become very complex in large firms-are carried out in the
business of a lemonade stand by one person. See also KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 5
(defining "sole proprietorship" as "a business owned directly by one individual"). Klein and
Coffee state that because sole proprietorships have "no formal elements of co-ownership" they
are not "usually thought of as a 'business organization' in the legal sense." Id. For the reasons
given above, however, I count sole proprietorships as the most basic kind of firm. See supra text
accompanying notes 124-125.
191. See supra Part I. Nevertheless, even pure sole proprietors often rely on external agen-
cies that lie outside of the boundaries of the firm in conducting business.
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cause they compete in organizational metamarkets with other types of
firms in supplying the needs of consumer markets.'92
A pure sole proprietorship may acquire limited liability for its single
owner.'93 Limited liability draws a line between the "entity" of the one-
person corporation or limited liability company and the individual who is
recognized for certain legal purposes as separate from the business. Close
questions along this boundary of the firm inform the jurisprudence of
"disregarding the corporate entity.',
19 4
Otherwise, the boundaries of the pure sole proprietorship coincide
with the individual person who runs the business. Pure sole proprietor-
ships, however, are rare. Much more commonly, sole proprietors share
internal agency relationships with other owners or employees.
B. Ownership and Employment. Horizontal and Vertical Firms
Except in the case of pure sole proprietorships, firms are created in
two directions when more than one person is involved. First, firms ex-
pand horizontally in the sense of sharing control and ownership of a
business with another party. Second, firms expand vertically by creating
hierarchical relationships of control through ownership structures and
employment. Both of these dimensions involve the creation of legal
agency relationships; hence the nexus of agency relationships that charac-
terizes most firms.
An example of a horizontal firm is the general partnership with equal
rights of control and ownership. An example of a vertical firm is the sole
proprietorship with employees. In practice, purely horizontal or vertical
firms are rarely encountered. Most actual firms combine horizontal and
vertical agency relationships of control, ownership, and employment.
1. Horizontal Ownership
Often a business functions more effectively when enterprise-
organizers join forces. When this is done on a relatively equal basis, a
192. See supra Part III.
193. A debate once raged about this issue, but it has been resolved in favor of recognizing
one-person corporations and, more recently, one-person limited liability companies. See
REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.01 (allowing that "[o]ne or more persons" may incorpo-
rate); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 202 ("One or more persons may organize a limited liability
company, consisting of one or more members .... ); Twelfth Council Directive 89/667 on sin-
gle-member private limited-liability companies, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 40 (requiring all member
states in the European Community to recognize one-person companies but allowing special
legislation to provide safeguards to protect third-parties).
194. For a comprehensive treatment, see STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE COR-
PORATE VEIL (1991).
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general partnership is created.195 Enterprise-organizers agree to pool
their capital and labor (or, in the extreme case, one partner provides only
capital and the other only labor). The distinguishing feature is that part-
ners share the right of control, risk of loss, and any profits.196
Those who enter into a partnership become legal agents of each
other 97 This horizontal agency relationship is a defining characteristic of
the firm. Each partner has legal authority to bind the other in the busi-
ness, and each is liable for partnership debts."' As agents, general part-
ners also owe one another mutual fiduciary duties of trust and loyalty.1
The mutual obligations of partners can be altered by agreement, but only
within legal limits.2
Other organizational forms also expand horizontal ownership of a
firm. In limited partnerships, for example, limited partners have owner-
ship rights to a share of profits and losses, though only general partners
exercise control rights.2H Limited liability companies (LLCs), limited li-
ability partnerships (LLPs), and corporations also allow for an increase in
the number of equity owners, while limiting their liability to the capital
invested in the business.m
Limited liability influences the shape and selection of business firms.
Because of the costs of liability and tax consequences, limited liability is
obviously important from an economic perspective.2°3 However, limited
195. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 6(1) (1994) ("[P]artnership is an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."); REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
Act § 202(a) (1995) ("association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit forms a partnership").
196. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 61 (stating that partnership exists when two or
more people have agreed to engage in a business and share in profits and control).
197. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9 (1994) (discussing partners as agents of partnership
business); REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Act § 301 (1995) (same).
198. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Act § 15(b) (1994) (stating that partners are liable for "debts
and obligations of the partnership"); REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Act § 306 (1995) (stating
similar rule though recognizing the limited liability partnership option).
199. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21 (1994) (stating that partners are accountable as fi-
duciaries); REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 (1995) (stating that are partners subject to
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Our Partners' Keepers?
Agency Dimensions of Partnership Relationships, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1995, at
109 (describing law of partnership in terms of agency law and fiduciary obligations).
200. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 103(a) (asserting that partnerships are
"governed by the partnership agreement" with exceptions including the right to inspect books
and records, mandatory fiduciary duties, and rights to end the partnership). There is a debate
about the extent to which the RUPA allows partners to contract out of fiduciary duties and the
wisdom of this departure from the UPA. For a recent collection of essays on the topic, see Sym-
posium, The Future of the Unincorporated Firm, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439 (1997).
201. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 98-101 (describing limited partnerships).
202. See id. at 101-03 (giving a basic description of these alternatives); see also Symposium,
LLCs, LLPs, and the Evolving Corporate Form, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855 (1995) (collecting
articles on the topic). For further description of the corporate firm, see infra Section V.D.
203. See, e.g., William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax
Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1001 (1995).
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liability does not change the underlying importance of agency relation-
ships in firms. Firms would continue to exist even if the benefits of lim-
ited liability were eliminated because firms allow individual participants
to capitalize on the economic benefits of organization.2 Nevertheless,
the contested scope of limited liability describes an important boundary
of the firm with respect to ownership and control25
A related boundary of the firm along the dimension of horizontal
ownership involves inadvertent partnership. Because partners share in
the liabilities of the business, boundary cases arise when a person who
did not want to be considered a partner is later sued by a third-party for
business debts or other liabilities. Purported creditors, employees, limited
partners, or LLC members may face claims of inadvertent partnership
and liability on the basis of their participation in profit-sharing and legal
control.
2. Vertical Authority
The hierarchical organization of ownership and control in firms refers
to the economic concept of "vertical integration."' " Governance of part-
nerships, LLCs, and corporations usually occurs through hierarchical or
vertical authority structures. In corporate groups of parents and subsidi-
aries, vertical ownership structures become more complex, but they also
involve the establishment of agency control. The issue of legal control of
business entities raises important boundary questions for vertically inte-
grated firms. In securities law, for example, liability often turns on
204. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text (recounting some of the economic
benefits of firm organization).
205. See also supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text. For the legal debate about the
desirability of limited liability, see Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability
Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1992); Richard A. Booth, Limited Liabil-
ity and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 140 (1994); Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J.
1879 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1565 (1991); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Li-
ability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1994).
206. Several classic teaching cases illustrate the point. See, e.g., Frank v. R.A. Pickens &
Son Co., 572 S.W.2d 133 (Ark. 1978) (discussing the line between profit-sharing employment
and partnership); Holzman v. De Escamilla, 195 P.2d 833 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (warning that
limited partners are liable as general partners when they exert control of the business); Martin
v. Peyton, 158 N.E. 77 (N.Y. 1927) (exploring the line between creditors and partners).
207. For economic treatments of vertical integration, see WILLIAMSON, supra note 74, at
85-130; WILLIAMSON, supra note 131, at 85-100; Grossman & Hart, supra note 160; Benjamin
Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,
21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership:
The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 199 (1988). Es-
sentially, these accounts attempt to explain in economic terms when, to achieve particular ob-
jectives, it is cheaper or more efficient to organize vertically as a firm than to make horizontal
contracts in the market.
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whether a firm exercises effective "control" over a subsidiary or agent.8
The question of effective legal control of firms also arises in antitrust
law."'
A different kind of vertical or hierarchical relationship is created
when employees are hired. For general employees who work at a con-
tractual wage, an owning or controlling "boss" usually directs the work.
Employment is distinguished from multiple-ownership arrangements by
hierarchical authority. Compensation usually does not include profit-
sharing, though emerging trends toward employee ownership plans and
incentive pay structures combine the vertical authority of employment
with an interest in the horizontal ownership of the enterprise. 20 Even
with profit-sharing or modest levels of employee ownership in the firm,
however, the employer retains legal agency authority to direct the work
of a general employee.21' This remains true in firms that follow the re-
cent trend toward "flattening" the organizational structure of a business
to devolve greater responsibility to lower levels of employees.
212
Someone with authority in the firm makes the decision to "flatten.,
213
In vertical employment relationships, an important boundary of the
firm is drawn between a general employee and an independent contrac-
tor. An employee subject to the general authority of the employer is usu-
ally considered "inside" the firm, and an independent contractor is usu-
208. See, e.g., Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 369-81 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing various concepts of "control" under securities
statutes); id. at 1085-89 (discussing secondary liability of "controlling persons").
209. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and
the Future, 75 CAL. L. REV. 959, 959-63 (1987) (discussing problem of ascribing intention to
"control price" to firms in antitrust analysis); Milton Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1287 (1982) (reviewing various problems of control in antitrust law).
210. Profit-sharing with employees is becoming increasingly popular. See, e.g., Martin L.
Weitzman & Douglas L. Kruse, Profit Sharing and Productivity, in PAYING FOR PRODUC-
TIVITY, supra note 173, at 95. In particular, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) have be-
come increasingly large and significant. See JOSEPH R. BLASI & DOUGLAS L. KRUSE, THE NEW
OWNERS: THE MASS EMERGENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN PUBLIC COMPANIES AND
WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS (1991); see also supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
211. See supra Section I.A; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 383, 385
(1958) (discussing agent's duty to act as authorized and duty to obey).
212. See, e.g., Thomas A. Kochan, The American Corporation as an Employer, in THE
AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 242, 252 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996) (describing "the move-
ment to decentralize decision making and flatten organizational structures").
213. See Edward H. Bowman & Michael Useem, The Anomalies of Corporate Governance,
in REDESIGNING THE FIRM 21, 31 (Edward H. Bowman & Bruce M. Kogut eds., 1995) ("If a
new set of practices was pushed down the firm's hierarchy, few new practices were pushed up.
Empowerment, decentralization, and flexibility became the new 'best practices' below the chief
executive, but they found little application above."). Authority structures to direct employees
are also present in "employee-owned" firms of a size large enough to require coordination of
work other than through face-to-face consensus. Examples in the United States include Weirton
Steel and United Airlines. For a useful discussion of the costs of governance in employee-
owned firms, see HANSMANN, supra note 8, at 89-119.
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ally "outside., 21 4 For example, employees may act as agents to bind their
firms to contracts, and firms may be held vicariously liable for tortious
harm caused by their agent-employees. The talismans for vicarious li-
ability are whether the employee acted as a "servant" and whether the
action at issue was within "the scope of employment.,
216
The boundaries of vicarious liability of the firm are not easily drawn,
but courts do so when asked.2 7 The recent phenomenon of "downsizing"
employees and replacing them by "outsourcing" independent contractors
illustrates the practical importance of this boundary of the firm. Because
independent contractors are considered "outside" the firm for some
kinds of vicarious liability, as well as for tax and other reasons, this strat-
egy saves the firm organizational costs by exploiting its own "blurred
boundaries., 218 The phenomenon of downsizing shows how the legal
background rules concerning the boundaries of firms can have significant
social effects.219
214. In agency law, this boundary is usually described as one between a "servant" and an
independent contractor. Although there are important technical differences, I adopt the simpli-
fying assumption here that for most practical purposes the general employee and legal servant
are the same. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 cmts. a-d (1958) (distinguishing
servants, nonservant agents, independent contractors, and employees).
215. See supra notes 26, 44-47 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY §§ 228-31 (1958) (describing scope of employment and noting that "forbidden" and
"criminal" acts may also lie within the scope of an agent's employment); Alan 0. Sykes, The
Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1231 (1984) ("Hierarchy and delegation
are so pervasive in modem business relationships that a staggering number of legal disputes
directly or indirectly involve rules of vicarious liability.").
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958) ("The conception of the
master's liability to third persons appears to be an outgrowth of the idea that within the time of
service, the master can exercise control over the physical activities of the servant. From this, the
idea of responsibility for the harm done by the servant's activities followed naturally. The as-
sumption of control is a usual basis for imposing tort liability when the thing controlled causes
harm."); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, 101 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1988)
(analyzing "scope of employment" rule). For a recent debate on the justification of vicarious
liability, compare Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious
Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 101 (1996), with Stephen P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On
the Sources and Limits of Employee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705 (1996); see also
Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1266 (1997).
217. See, e.g., CONARD ET AL., supra note 3, at 86-88 (collecting cases and references);
Sykes, supra note 216, at 581-93 (describing "scope of employment" rule and its exceptions).
218. Kochan, supra note 212, at 253-55, 262 (discussing rationale of firms using independent
contractors and problems associated with increasing numbers of "contingent workers" in labor
force); see also Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Workers in the United States, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J.
503 (1997) (discussing increasing use of part-time, temporary, and detached employment to re-
duce labor costs and collecting sources).
219. See, e.g., Lester Thurow, Almost Everywhere: Surging Inequality and Falling Real
Wages, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY, supra note 212, at 386 (documenting the
downsizing of more than two million workers in the United States from 1990 to 1994); Richard
Waters, Return of the Downsizers, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1997, at 13 (documenting another wave
of thousands of job cuts in 1997). By most accounts, "downsizing has been devastating" for em-
ployees, most of whom do not get equivalent-paying new jobs. Thurow, supra, at 388. A series
of articles in The New York Times focused attention on this issue. See THE NEW YORK TIMES,
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Like partners, employees and employers owe one another different
kinds of fiduciary duties under the law of agency. Also like partners,
employees and employers may waive or alter most of their fiduciary du-
ties by contract.2 In firms with labor unions, collective bargaining enters
at this employment boundary of the firm. At this boundary also, state
and federal statutes condition the terms of employment and restrict dis-
criminatory practices.m
C. Property: Ownership of the Firm's Capital
Another important characteristic of a firm is the ownership of its fi-
nancial capital and other property. In addition to its economic impor-
tance, ownership structure is essential for determining the legal control of
firms.m The capital structure of firms is commonly divided into catego-
ries of debt and equity, though various hybrid instruments fudge this dis-
tinction in practice. 24 Sometimes debt is considered purely financial,
without control rights, and equity is considered to represent true
"ownership." But reality is not this simple.
THE DOWNSIZING OF AMERICA (1996) (collecting news articles and editorial responses); see
also DAVID M. GORDON, FAT AND MEAN: THE CORPORATE SQUEEZE OF WORKING
AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF MANAGERIAL DOWNSIZING 51-60 (1996) (arguing that down-
sizing hit blue-collar workers hardest, contrary to emphasis in the media on firings of white-
collar middle managers).
220. Unlike partnerships and in keeping with the hierarchical authoritative nature of em-
ployment relationships, employer and employee fiduciary duties are not equal and mutual.
Nevertheless, in addition to whatever duties the employment contract specifies, an employee
owes an employer a general "duty of care and skill," a duty of "good conduct," a duty to convey
relevant information about the business, a duty to account for any profits, and a duty not to act
adversely to the interests of the employer in a transaction not known to the employer. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379-80, 388-89 (1958). An employer owes an employee
duties to provide an opportunity to perform the work, to refrain from undue interference in the
work, to provide necessary information, to keep and render accurate accounts, and to indemnify
the employee for certain losses incurred in the business. See id. §§ 433-36, 438-39. The employer
is also subject to a general duty of "good conduct," as well as a duty to pay compensation. Id. §§
437,441.
221. See id. § 376 ("The existence and extent of the duties of the agent to the principal are
determined by the terms of the agreement between the parties, interpreted in light of the cir-
cumstances .... "). The phrase "unless otherwise agreed" often appears in the Restatement. See
id. Scope Note, at 4.
222. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. Some scholars argue that fiduciary duties
to employees should be expanded to be enforceable against managers in situations such as un-
justifiable downsizing or plant relocations. See supra notes 176, 219 and accompanying text.
However, reforming employment and labor law may offer a more promising avenue for policing
the employment boundary of the firm. See, e.g., PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE:
THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW (1990); Symposium, The Changing Work-
place, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1485 (1996); Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment
Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1992).
223. See supra Sections IV.C, V.A and Subsection V.B.1.
224. This Article follows the traditional legal analytical distinction between "debt" refer-
ring to creditors and "equity" referring to shareholders. In contemporary practice, this distinc-
tion is blurred. For an introduction, see KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 288-97 (describing
preferred stock, convertible bonds, and other "hybrids" and "derivatives").
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1. Debt
Very commonly, an enterprise-organizer obtains capital from an out-
side provider who agrees to supply financing in return for a promise to
repay the principal with interest.2 Because debt relationships are pri-
marily contractual, creditors usually stand "outside" the agency relation-
ships of a firm.m In certain situations, however, credit financing impli-
cates elements of control and ownership. Secured creditors, for example,
have a direct right in the event of nonpayment to seize the property of a
firm that provides the "security." ' In the event of insolvency, creditors
can step into control and ownership of the enterprise under bankruptcy
law.m Fiduciary duties may also owe to creditors when the corporation
is "in the vicinity of insolvency."' 29 In these kinds of situations, which
usually arise when the firm falls on hard times, creditors become involved
in running the firm.
Given that creditor relationships may give rise to rights of control and
ownership in adverse economic situations, creditors should be included in
a legal theory of the firm, even if peripherally. In ordinary circumstances
when the firm is a "going concern," the interests of creditors in the gov-
ernance and direction of the firm are often minimal. In situations of de-
fault on secured debt, insolvency, or bankruptcy, however, what may be
called springing rights of control and ownership in the firm become active
225. For an introduction to the various forms of debt and its attributes, see id at 225-56.
226. In ordinary circumstances, the creditor cannot act to bind the firm in the market, and
the firm is not liable for torts of the creditor. Even in the simplest situations, however, a creditor
must take care not to become a "partner" inadvertently by (1) exercising too much control over
the direction and management of the business with the enterprise-organizers and (2) sharing in
the profits of the enterprise. If a court finds a creditor to be in fact a "partner" or "principal" of
a business, the creditor is liable for its obligations. See supra note 206 and accompanying text;
see also A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981) (illustrating a
lender's risk of exercising control and thereby becoming liable as a principal in agency law).
227. For an introduction, see Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Fi-
nancing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining
the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1997).
228. For an account of governance issues in bankruptcy reorganizations, see, for example,
Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1547 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993).
229. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991
W.L. 277613, at n.55 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1991); see also Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpret-
ing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 115-22 (1992) (discussing this
exception to the no-fiduciary-duty rule for creditors and possible statutory support for it). But
see Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to
Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1993) (arguing that cases in fact should be read as applying
"extra-contractual" rather than fiduciary duty to creditors); C. Robert Morris, Directors' Duties
in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A Comment on Credit Lyonnais, 19 J. CORP. L. 61 (1993)
(arguing that creditors are entitled only to contractual protection); Dale B. Tauke, Should
Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate Bondholder Rights,
1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 (arguing that creditors deserve only contractual protection but
analysis should be expansive).
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for creditors. In addition, even when things are going well, debt financing
of the firm can provide structural discipline by putting pressure on man-
agers and equity owners to make relatively high interest payments, rather
than allowing them to rely on the "cushion" of retained earnings.2
Creditors may also strongly influence the governance of the firm through
detailed provisions in the loan agreements.
23
1
Like the boundary separating a firm's employees and independent
contractors, the boundary determining when creditors are "inside" or
"outside" the firm is not always sharp. In general, it is described by (1)
the right of creditors to control or assert ownership in assets of a firm in
adverse economic situations and (2) the structural power of creditors to
negotiate governance provisions in loan agreements. For purposes of the
theory of a firm advanced here, it is sufficient to recognize the general
outlines of creditor relationships as a boundary of the firm without a
comprehensive examination of its contours.232
2. Equity
Recall that an enterprise-organizer may acquire additional capital by
teaming up with another in a partnership and agreeing to share profits
and losses. 3 More complex business forms, such as corporations, raise
capital by splitting equity ownership rights into "shares."2 34 Shareholders
exercise control rights of owners through voting, but these rights are
conditioned by the legal structure of corporations.ns
In close corporations, ownership and control are often unified be-
cause the majority shareholders and managers are identical. Large public
corporations, however, are usually characterized by a separation of own-
230. Particularly in more complex forms of business enterprise such as corporations, see
infra Section V.D, debt can provide an efficient structural alternative or supplement to equity
capital financing. For an economic account of debt financing and capital structure in a property
theory of the firm, see HART, supra note 18, at 93-155. For an account emphasizing the legal
control that debtors can exert in firms that they finance, see George G. Triantis & Ronald J.
Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1073 (1995).
Empirical evidence suggests that managers may not leverage firms as much as most sharehold-
ers prefer in the absence of an event that "disciplines" managers, such as a threatened takeover.
See Philip G. Berger et al., Why CEOs Use Insufficient Debt, WHARTON J., Oct. 27, 1997, at A2.
231. For an introduction to various common types of covenants in debt contracts, see
KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 240-44.
232. Part VI returns to consider one aspect of this boundary of the firm with respect to pos-
sible fiduciary duties owing to creditors in certain situations. See infra Subsection VI.B.3.
233. See supra Subsection V.B.1.
234. In economic terms, shareholders "collectively own the residual or equity interest in the
corporation." KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 118.
235. Because the legal structures of corporations, partnerships, and LLCs place restrictions
on residual control, the economic theory of the firm that emphasizes property is incomplete
from a legal perspective, though this economic theory correctly points out the source of bar-
gaining power with employees in the ownership of the assets of the firm. See supra Section IV.C.
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ership and control. Everyday operational control settles in a centralized
management.26 Shareholders retain rights to vote by proxy for the board
of directors, to sell shares into a tender offer, and to hold directors and
managers to their fiduciary duties through the possibility of shareholder
derivative suits.27 The primary interest of public shareholders, however,
is that of an investor in the financial capital of the firm. To account for
the various rights and responsibilities of shareholders and other partici-
pants in corporations, a legal theory of the firm is needed.
D. Complex Firms: The Corporation
The corporate form embraces complex structures of control and capi-
tal ownership. Beginning with control, enterprise-organizers may retain
full ownership of the business and simply incorporate or form an LLC to
obtain the legal benefit of limited liability. But equity financing also pro-
vides a mechanism to raise outside capital rather than relying solely on
retained earnings and debt financing. This alternative of investing in the
ownership of a business through the purchase of corporate shares attracts
investors seeking higher levels of risk and return.2" As a result of this
236. For an introduction to the basic legal structure of public corporations and the "master
problem" of accountability created by the separation of ownership and control, see JESSE H.
CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1-10, 22-23, 24 (4th ed. 1995).
There is a debate, as yet unsettled, about whether the rise of institutional investors will help to
close this gap between shareholders and managers. For a discussion and references to the rele-
vant literature, see Orts, supra note 3.
237. Procedural hurdles to derivative shareholder suits alleging fiduciary duty violations,
however, have grown higher in recent years. With respect to the duty of care, one commentator
questions whether it "entails a useful norm of behavior" given that the "level of care re-
quired ... is low, and the quality of [business] judgment is even lower." Brudney, supra note 22,
at 599 & n.12. Forgiving standards of review, state exculpation statutes allowing directors and
managers to be immunized from liability, and strict procedural requirements involving the de-
mand requirement and the use of special litigation committees have effectively eliminated the
enforcement of fiduciary duties of care in the corporate context, except perhaps for directors in
financial institutions. See, e.g., id. at 600 n.12. For an overview of the law of derivative share-
holder litigation, see DEBORAH A. DEMoTr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW
AND PRACTICE (1994); KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 195-201. Another partial exception
appears in the "enhanced" standard of review applied in some hostile takeover situations. See,
e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985). A similar trend is
evident in "increasingly slack" enforcement of "restrictions on self-dealing" under the fiduciary
duty of loyalty. Brudney, supra note 22, at 629.
238. Again, the conceptual line between "equity" shareholders and "debt" creditors is not
always clearly drawn in practice. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. Some stock, for
example, is nonvoting and therefore without direct control rights. Preferred stock is usually best
treated as a type of debt. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred
Stock (and Why We Should Care About It), 51 Bus. LAW. 443, 444 (1996) ("[T]he preferred
stockholder ought not think of himself or herself as a stockholder at all and should plan to rely
exclusively on his or her contract as the source of rights .... ). At the sane time, certain kinds
of debt may be convertible into equity with voting rights. Debt known as "high-yield" or "junk"
bonds may also provide for high risk and high return similar financially to common stock. For
an introduction, see KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 238-40, 293-94. Given this complexity, a
determination of the relative weight of "equity" or "debt" for any particular financial instru-
ment often depends on the circumstances.
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process in which shares are widely distributed, most large corporations
have centralized control in professional managers and established com-
plex financing arrangements that include retained earnings, outside credi-
tors, and shareholder investors.
Traveling with the difference in the capital structure of corporations is
also a fundamental change in agency relationships. Economic theories of
the firm often cast the board of directors as an "agent" of shareholders, 29
but this characterization is not correct as matter of law.2 0 Although
board members "resemble agents in that they act on behalf of others and
are fiduciaries owing duties of loyalty and care," they owe these duties
"to the corporation itself rather than to the shareholders individually or
collectively." 24' Because the board has statutory authority to "manage"
the corporation,242 descriptions of corporate directors as simply the
agents of shareholders are legally flawed.243
A realistic theory of the firm must account for the different legal
agency structures in the corporation. In partnerships, owners are princi-
pals. In corporations, shareholders are equity owners but not always di-
rectors or managers, especially in large public corporations. Shareholders
do not act as principals in the everyday management of public corpora-
tions, even though they participate in a manner similar to principals when
239. See Bowman & Useem, supra note 213, at 23, 29, 32 (describing the assumptions in
applications of principal-agent theory to corporations and arguing that they do not accurately
portray reality); Dennis C. Mueller, The Corporation and the Economist, 10 INT'L J. INDUS.
ORG. 147, 157-58 (1992) (advancing similar critical description of principal-agent theories of the
corporation).
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (1958) ("Neither the board of direc-
tors nor an individual director of a business is, as such, an agent of the corporation or of its
members.").
241. Id. § 14C cmt. a. This distinction continues to be important in shareholder lawsuits to
enforce violations of fiduciary duties of directors or managers. They must be brought
"derivatively" in a representative capacity on behalf of the corporate entity. See supra note 237
and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1984) ("All corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the
articles of incorporation or in an agreement authorized [by the shareholders in advance]"). Al-
though most state corporate statutes now allow this sort of "opting out" of a board of directors,
most large corporations have boards and, when they do, the board has authority to act for the
corporation in most instances.
243. Robert Clark describes this difficulty as follows:
To an experienced corporate lawyer who has studied primary legal materials, the as-
sertion that corporate managers are agents of investors would seem odd or loose. The
lawyer would make the following points: (1) corporate officers like the president and
treasurer are agents of the corporation itself; (2) the board of directors is the ultimate
decision-making body of the corporation...; (3) directors are not agents of the corpo-
ration but are sui generis; (4) neither officers nor directors are agents of the stockhold-
ers; but (5) both officers and directors are "fiduciaries" with respect to the corporation
and its stockholders.
Clark, supra note 140, at 56; see also supra Section II.B.
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electing board members and sharing in profits.2 Like chief executive of-
ficers, shareholders in large corporations are more accurately described
as quasi-principals because they sometimes exercise the prerogatives of
ownership and control, and sometimes they do not-sharing ownership
with the rights of creditors (and the corporate entity itself), and sharing
authority and control with corporate directors and officers. 245 For most
practical purposes, managers are the enterprise-organizers in corpora-
tions with their authority delegated from the board. Shareholders exer-
cise power over the board through voting at annual or special meetings2 46
and through shareholder derivative lawsuits.247 They also, of course, re-
ceive dividends (when they are declared) and can sell their shares (at a
profit or loss). Only in these senses do shareholders act as "principals" of
corporations. In legal terms, the relationship between shareholders and
directors/managers is not a direct agency, but rather a special form of
quasi-agency governed by an overlay of state corporate law.
The complex structure of corporations allows for significant flexibility
in terms of financing and organization. Agency and fiduciary relation-
ships become elongated. Contracts define the financial, managerial, and
employment arrangements within a corporation, but they occur within
the nexus of agency relationships that describes the legal structure. In the
corporate firm, a new set of boundaries forms within this web of agency
relationships.248 Shareholders act as residual owners, yet in public corpo-
rations they are also investors who may exit the firm in an electronic
flash. Managers are high-level employees of the corporation, yet they are
also delegated considerable authority to act on behalf of the firm-often
as if they were principals.249 The board has formal authority to act as the
principal decision-making body, yet its members are also elected by the
shareholders and often covertly selected by the managers.250 The
244. See DeMott, supra note 199, at 109 (" The baseline assumptions about the corporate
form are that the corporation itself, not its owners, is the principal, that management is central-
ized into a hierarchical structure of directors, officers, and nonofficer managerial employees,
and that shareholders risk no individual liability for corporate debts, beyond the amount they
invested.").
245. See supra Sections I.A, II.B, V.C. For an account of the divided rights of ownership
and control in the corporation, see John Kay & Aubrey Silberston, Corporate Governance, in 2
PERSPECrIVES ON COMPANY LAW 49,52-56 (Fiona Macmillan Patfield ed., 1997).
246. Another option is the shareholder consent solicitation. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE § 228
(West 1997).
247. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
248. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986).
249. See supra Section II.B (describing corporate executives as both agents and quasi-
principals).
250. See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foun-
dations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1985, at 83; see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 139-48
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boundaries of these various relationships within the corporation shift in
various circumstances-such as when shareholders sue, directors deliber-
ate, managers are fired, or the ownership of the corporation changes
hands.21
E. Complex Groups: Relational Firms
Including sole proprietors, partnerships, limited liability companies,
and corporations as firms should meet with the common knowledge of
most lawyers familiar with the basic law of enterprise organization. The
borderline cases of pure sole proprietorships, employment relations, and
the role of creditors may prove more controversial, but they remain
within the ken of traditional legal understandings of business firms. A last
type of firm that competes with others in organizational metamarkets
steps further outside traditional forms to include "relational contracts"
made between or among simpler firms to act in unison.5
2
This type of relationalfirm acts as one entity for certain purposes and
at the same time retains separate boundaries of smaller firms within it.
One example is the corporate group with "subsidiary" corporations or-
ganized under a corporate "parent." Corporate groups act as one entity
for some purposes (such as financial control), but they are also composed
of subsidiary entities for other purposes (such as separate governance or
limited liability).,5' Other examples include joint ventures, franchises,
distributorships, and other arrangements that do not fit the model of a
single, integrated firm.2
(1976) (describing the "captured board" syndrome).
251. Given the complexity of the ownership structure of many corporations, change of
ownership often means more precisely that enough ownership assets are acquired by a new per-
son or group of persons to enable a transfer of effective control of the enterprise (i.e., ownership
of sufficient shares to elect a new CEO).
252. I use the term "relational contract" to refer to governance arrangements between two
firms or among a group of firms described previously in this Part which have the effect of uni-
fying the efforts of the resulting "relational firm" in the organizational metamarket. Cf.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 74, at 68-84; George Baker et al., Relational Contracts and the Theory
of the Firm (Harvard Business School Working Paper, Dec. 29, 1997) (copy on file with author);
G.B. Richardson, The Organization of Industry, 82 ECON. J. 883 (1972). This usage is not the
sense of the term "relational contracts" used in either the broad social sense, see, for example,
Ian R. Mcneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, or
the broad economic sense of "relational exchange," see, for example, Victor Goldberg, Rela-
tional Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, 23 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 337
(1980).
253. For an introduction to the law of corporate groups, including the multinational enter-
prise, see PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW
(1993). Some legal systems recognize and regulate corporate groups more directly than in the
United States. Most notable in this regard are the German rules governing Konzernrecht
("related companies"). See, e.g., ERIC STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY
LAWS: NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION 89,105-07, 468 (1971).
254. In distributorships and franchises, "when the sales and distribution component of a
venture is legally independent of the manufacturing or service-supplying component,... the
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The boundaries of the firm become difficult to ascertain in these
kinds of relational firms. Whether a relational firm is considered one en-
tity or a group of entities will depend, again, on the question that is
asked. If the question is one of limited liability, the answer will focus on
the lines of demarcation between the corporate entities that compose re-
lational firms. If the question is whether a relational firm is acting as a
unit in competing with other firms in markets, the answer will focus on
the lines of authority that enable it to act as a single entity.
Relational firms highlight the analytical difficulty in defining the
boundaries of the firm. From an economic perspective of the organiza-
tional metamarket, complex relational firms compete with other kinds of
firms to supply goods and services to consumer markets. From a legal
perspective, the boundaries of relational firms are dynamic and shift in
response to different questions about different elements of organiza-
tion.2
F. The Legal Boundaries of the Firm
The legal theory of the firm advanced here does not provide a simple
account with clear-cut boundaries. Instead, the boundaries of the firm
fluctuate in the key areas of control, ownership, and employment. My
purpose has been to outline these legal boundaries, rather than to de-
scribe them in detail.
In general, the "black box" of the firm has the following legal
two components can be thought of as parts of a single organization," if each depends on the
other. Klein, supra note 20, at 1533. On joint ventures, see Steven R. Salbu & Richard A.
Brahm, Strategic Considerations in Designing Joint Venture Contracts, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 253. On franchises, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and Collective Rights of Franchi-
sees, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1503 (1990).
Price-fixing or other collusive arrangements that raise issues of antitrust law might also
be described as creating relational firms. A touchstone in antitrust analysis is often control. See
supra note 209 and accompanying text. From the larger theoretical perspective suggested
above, the general problem of antitrust law might be redescribed as regulation of the organiza-
tional metamarket of firms to assure competition in the supply of consumer markets. See supra
Section III.B. In any event, the law of antitrust certainly affects the size of firms. See, e.g., Tony
Freyer, Legal Restraints on Economic Coordination: Antitrust in Great Britain and America,
1880-1920, in COORDINATION AND INFORMATION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF ENTERPRISE 183 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Daniel M.G. Raff eds., 1995)
(arguing that the enforcement of antitrust laws in the United States led ironically but benefi-
cially to the growth of large-scale corporate enterprises through mergers).
255. Difficult hybrid cases lying in a gray area between relational firms and markets re-
main. These cases usually involve relatively long-term contractual relationships between firms
legally organized in one of the forms described above. Often these intermediary arrangements
are for supplies, marketing, or distribution. See supra note 254 and accompanying text; see also
supra note 252 (describing "relational contracts" and "relational exchange"). In terms of the
theoretical perspective offered here, these relationships would be described as either relational
firms or market contracts between firms, depending on the extent of integrated control, owner-
ship, and employment.
Yale Law & Policy Review
boundaries which fluctuate according to size and firm structure.26 The
boundaries of the firm include the vertical dimensions of legal control
and employment, and the horizontal dimensions of equity and debt own-
ership and financing. (See Figure 1.) One-person firms shrink these di-
mensions to a single dot. Complex relational firms multiply the number
of boxes. The thick lines indicate that the boundaries are not sharp. As
discussed above, various boundary problems include the following: lim-
ited liability, inadvertent ownership, the line separating employees and
independent contractors, whether and when creditors should be consid-
ered in the firm, the conflicting and ambiguous roles of principals and
agents, and two or more smaller firms acting as one relational firm.2
Figure 1








256. Cf supra note 97 and accompanying text (referring to the orthodox economic descrip-
tion of the firm as a "black box").
257. The fact that the boundaries of the firm pose difficult cases, hbwever, is not an argu-
ment against drawing lines. Consider, as an analogy, the idea that the United States has
boundaries. There are lines drawn on a map, but what do they mean? The border is not always
strictly enforced. If the United States is its economy, many noncitizens participate in it. If the
United States is its citizens, many live outside the geographical territory of the United States. If
the United States is its government, constitutional federalism raises complications. Like firms
within relational firms, the states are political entities within a larger national entity. Neverthe-
less, there is an underlying truth and usefulness in referring to "the United States." So also it is
useful to outline the boundaries of firms.
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VI. SHIRKING, SHARKING, AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
"There ain't no clean way to make a hundred million bucks," Ohls said.
"Maybe the head man thinks his hands are clean but somewhere along the
line guys got pushed to the wall, nice little businesses got the ground cut from
under them and had to sell out for nickels, decent people lost their jobs,
stocks got rigged on the market, proxies got bought up like a pennyweight of
old gold, and the five per centers and the big law firms got paid hundred-
grand fees for beating some law the people wanted but the rich guys didn't,
on account of it cut into their profits. Big money is big power and big power
gets used wrong. It's the system."2
8
Having described a legal theory of the firm and its boundaries, I turn
now to consider a prescriptive application of this theory in legal practice.
As first suggested above in Part II, the costs of sharking by principals and
quasi-principals in positions of what Chandler's character calls "big
power" in a firm often prove as large as the costs of shirking by agents. If
so, constraining both kinds of behavior in firms is important.59 Some
constraints appear at the various legal boundaries of the firm sketched in
Part V in the form of securities and antitrust law, labor and employment
law, and the law of enterprise organization. Other constraints include
those of environmental law and the criminal prohibition of fraud, theft,
and extortion.w This Part focuses on only one piece of the larger picture
of legal constraints on the behavior of individuals in firms. It examines
the relationship between the law of fiduciary duties and the costs of
shirking and sharking within business corporations.21
A. Constraining Shirking
As described above in Part I, shirking refers to the costs of all agents
in a firm who choose to further their own self-interests at the expense of
the collective interests of the firm. In the context of the corporate firm,
258. RAYMOND CHANDLER, THE LONG GOODBYE 227 (1953).
259. Cf. Klein, supra note 20 (recognizing the importance of legal constraints as well as con-
tractual bargaining).
260. See Joseph Vining, Corporations, Criminal Law, -and the Color of Money, MICH. L.
QUADRANGLE NoTEs, Spring 1997, at 87 ("The application of the criminal law to business cor-
porations has one overriding function. It counters, as can nothing else, the temptation to define
the purpose of the corporate entity as the maximization of money profit.").
261. As a practical matter, it makes sense to focus on corporations. Although the most re-
cently available statistics indicate that there are quantitatively more sole proprietorships and
partnerships than corporations (16.3 million of the former compared to 3.7 million corporations
in the United States in 1990), corporations account for more than 90 percent of total sales and
receipts. The 7000 largest corporations (each with assets of $250 million or more) make up
more than half of all sales and receipts of businesses. See Carl Kaysen, Introduction and Over-
view, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY, supra note 212, at 3, 5. Similar arguments with
respect to fiduciary duties may apply to other business firms, but they are left outside the scope
of this Article.
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shirking refers to the agency chain of command.2 2 Managers watch over
and seek to motivate employees. Shareholders watch over and seek to
motivate the board of directors and, through the board, the managers.
The direction of the analysis of shirking is generally "downward" in
terms of the vertical and hierarchical structure of the firm. 3 The pun-
ishment of agents is usually a self-help remedy, such as firing employees
or replacing managers or directors.
Because of the complex authority structures of large corporations, "
self-help remedies to police the shirking of top managers or the board of
directors are not directly available to shareholders, except in relatively
rare situations when a proxy fight or tender offer aims to replace ineffec-
tive, incompetent, lazy, or greedy management. Shareholder derivative
lawsuits developed historically to allow shareholders to police violations
of the fiduciary duties of managers or board members. Today, cases that
allege violations of the duty of care-in other words, some degree of
negligence by managers or directors-usually run into procedural prob-
lems and, even when they do not, judicial review is usually governed by a
forgiving "business judgment rule" that protects the discretion of direc-
tors and managers in most situations.265 More substantive judicial review
governs claims that agents have secretly diverted assets from the firm to
themselves.266 In corporate law, this problem of diverting assets is han-
dled by duty of loyalty restrictions on self-dealing (as well as criminal
prohibitions against theft and fraud).27 These restrictions also include
prohibitions against the misappropriation of corporate opportunities and
insider trading.6
Legal intervention as well as self-help by owners and enterprise-
organizers is often required to minimize the costs of shirking by agents.
This approach is well recognized in the economic and legal literature,
though debate continues about whether and when extra-contractual fidu-
ciary duties should be enforced. 69 The theoretical contribution here is to
recognize that efforts should also be made to reduce the costs of sharking
262- See supra Section II.B.
263. See supra Sections I.B, V.B, V.D.
264. See supra Sections II.B, V.D.
265. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. For a description of the business judgment
rule and its limits, see 1 COXETAL., supra note 23, §§ 10.1 to 10.10.
266. See Brudney, supra note 140, at 1406 (referring to management's "temptation to shirk
in its performance or to divert corporate assets to itself").
267. For an overview of the current law dealing with the duty of loyalty and self-dealing,
see 1 COX ET AL., supra note 23, §§ 10.11 to 10.18, 11.1 to 11.10.
268. For an overview of these two particular problems, see ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW chs. 7 & 8 (1986). On the law against insider trading, see also DONALD C.
LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION (1996);
WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARK I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1996).
269. See supra note 22 and Section I.B.
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by principals and quasi-principals in firms. As with shirking, contractual
self-protection alone is often not enough.
B. Constraining Sharking
As described above in Part II, economic theories of the firm usually
do not distinguish between "downward" and "upward" opportunism.
The direction depends on who within the firm is acting, with what
authority, and through what means. Traditional agency costs theory is
justly criticized for its preoccupation with the "downward opportunism"
of agents. 2'0 Focusing only on the principal's problem of controlling the
behavior of agents overlooks the opportunism of principals and quasi-
principals. The misuse of authority and power by principals and quasi-
principals within firms is called sharking to distinguish it from classical
agency costs.21 The term is colorful, but not more so than shirking. Un-
like shirking, which describes laziness, incompetence, or theft by agents,
sharking refers to the use of authority by principals and quasi-principals
to redistribute assets within the firm. Sharking can occur laterally against
other powerful players in the firm. More often, it is used in a direction of
"upward opportunism" to the advantage of principals and quasi-
principals (such as shareholders or corporate management) against the
interests of other principals or agents (such as minority shareholders,
creditors, or even rank-and-file employees).'m
For purposes of illustration, this Part briefly discusses four general
situations that may involve sharking within corporations: conflicts be-
tween majority and minority shareholders, executive compensation,
downgrading of creditors, and financial reengineering of capital structure.
Each of these situations of potential interfirm opportunism by principals
or quasi-principals is discussed in turn. The illustrations do not provide
full-fledged arguments describing proper legal standards to constrain the
various forms of sharking described. Each problem may call for regula-
tory responses not only in corporate law, but in other areas such as secu-
rities, tax, or bankruptcy. A common normative prescription, however, is
to reinvigorate fiduciary duties (along with the procedural means to en-
force them) to address some of these kinds of problems.
270. See Gregory K. Dow, The Function of Authority in Transaction Costs Economics, 8 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1987); see also supra Section II.A.
271. See supra Section II.A.
272. For an early recognition in terms of game theory of the problem of sharking, see John
C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J.
1495 (1990). In addition to the examples given below, the downsizing phenomenon discussed
supra Subsection V.B.2 may sometimes involve sharking against rank-and-file employees.
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1. Oppression of Minority Shareholders
A well-known problem in corporate law is the misuse of the authority
of a controlling majority of shareholders to "oppress" minority share-
holders.23 The problem often arises in close corporations when control-
ling shareholders engage unfairly in a "freezeout" or "squeezeout" of a
minority.' This kind of situation cannot be accounted for in agency the-
ory as a species of shirking. Instead, controlling shareholders and manag-
ers use their power and authority as quasi-principals to dilute or elimi-
nate the interests of minority shareholders who are also quasi-
principals2s Wronged minority shareholders may recover against the
majority for this sort of behavior, but the intervention of courts is usually
necessary, such as in proceedings for an appraisal or claims for equitable
relief for oppression.26 Although ex ante contracting can protect share-
holders who foresee the risk of oppression, self-help remedies alone are
not sufficient.m
273. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Robert B. Thompson, The Share-
holder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW. 699 (1993) (providing a general discus-
sion of remedies for oppression of minority shareholders in close corporations). For compara-
tive analysis, see Deborah A. DeMott, Oppressed But Not Betrayed: A Comparative Assessment
of Canadian Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Other Corporate Constituents, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 181, 191; Sandra K. Miller, Minority Shareholder Oppres-
sion in the Private Company in the European Community: A Comparative Analysis of the Ger-
man, United Kingdom, and French "Close Corporation Problem", 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 381
(1997).
274. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 268, at 499-530 (discussing general legal principles of
"freezeouts and buyouts"). A freezeout is a transaction in which the minority interest is invol-
untarily eliminated, for example, through a short-form statutory merger. See id. at 499
(describing a freezeout); id. at 502 (describing a short-form merger). A squeezeout is a transac-
tion that does not directly eliminate the minority shareholder but "has the purpose and practical
effect of making his situation so unrewarding that he is virtually disinvested or so unpleasant
that he will inevitably sell out on the insider's terms." Id- § 12.1, at 500.
275. As discussed supra Sections II.B and V.D, neither corporate shareholders nor manag-
ers exercise the full powers of a "principal" in agency law. They are better described as quasi-
principals.
276. For discussion of the purposes of and difficulties with the appraisal remedy, see Hideki
Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 429 (1985); Alexander Khutorsky, Coming in from the Cold- Reforming Shareholders' Ap-
praisal Rights in Freeze-Out Transactions, 1997 COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 133; Bayless Manning,
The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962). For
sources on equitable remedies for oppression, see supra notes 23, 273. For a comprehensive dis-
cussion of judicial remedies for minority shareholders, see F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1994).
277. Some commentators argue that this problem should be resolved entirely by ex ante
contracting. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 228-52. If minority share-
holders are not smart enough to foresee the risk of the majority later taking advantage of them,
then too bad. Shareholders will learn the lesson and either negotiate appropriate buyout clauses
or refuse to invest. This position is not persuasive, however, for several reasons. First, the future
is not easily foretold in business. When things turn out differently than shareholder investors
anticipated-due, for example, to the unfolding of a major dispute within a family corpora-
tion-allowing minority shareholders to bear the full brunt of changed circumstances is unfair.
Second, because minority shareholders represent an ownership interest in the firm, allowing a
majority to eliminate or significantly reduce the value of this interest violates the basic property
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Mistreatment of minority shareholders along these lines may occur in
sale-of-control transactions. In the United States, majority shareholders
have a right to sell control and retain a "control premium." 78 However,
this rule is subject to exceptions under both federal securities regulation
and state corporate law.2" Transactions in corporate control undertaken
by majority shareholders pose the risk of what one commentator calls
"insider imperialism."m This is not to say all control transactions that
freezeout minority shareholders are unfair or inefficient. Many transac-
tions in corporate control are both fair to minority shareholders and eco-
nomically beneficial. The legal problem is to distinguish "a transaction
that creates wealth from one that merely transfers it."'28
A theory of the firm that includes principal costs recognizes the risk
that some transactions may involve unfair wealth transfers from minority
shareholders. Although oppression of minority shareholders is a long-
standing problem,"2 it does not fit the standard economic account of
agency costs. The theory of the firm advanced here is broad enough to
rights of equity ownership. Affording minority shareholders no legal protection against abuse
by the majority would be tantamount to recognizing simple theft of the minority's investment
interest. Third, a lack of protection for minority shareholder interests would provide a disincen-
tive for any investor to take such a position, thus at least potentially decreasing the amount of
capital raised for business enterprise.
278. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Dela-
ware Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 359, 360 (1996) (discussing "the widely prevailing rule that a controlling shareholder may
receive a control premium for its shares" but noting this "consensus" is "surprising" because
"the United States stands virtually alone in failing to accord minority shareholders any pre-
sumptive right to share in a control premium" as compared to other countries).
279. Federal securities law requires that tender offers must be open to all holders at the
same price. See id at 371-76 (discussing Rule 14d-10 and its judicial applications). Going private
transactions that employ a tender offer and then a second step freezeout must treat minority
shareholders to a portion of any control premium. See id at 377-78 (discussing Rule 13e-3).
State corporate law protects minority shareholders in control transactions in the following situa-
tions: (1) when a controlling shareholder suspects that an acquirer may "loot" the corporation,
(2) when a sale of control involves the sale of a "corporate office," (3) when a sale of control
diverts a corporate opportunity, or (4) when a controlling shareholder discriminates against mi-
nority shareholders in the payment of dividends or other benefits that should be shared equally
by all. See id. at 378-85; Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1467-81 (1992). Statutory appraisal remedies also sometimes provide a
remedy to protect minority shareholders from unfair treatment at the hands of a majority in a
squeezeout or freezeout. See Coffee, supra note 278, at 385-87. On appraisal rights generally,
see CLARK, supra note 268, § 10.6, at 443-58; Kanda & Levmore, supra note 276; Manning, su-
pra note 276.
280. CLARK, supra note 268, at 499.
281. Coffee, supra note 278, at 369; see also Elhauge, supra note 279, at 1466 (asserting that
the problem in "sale of control" cases is to determine in each case "whether the control transfer
is likely to be harmful or productive").
282. For an historical account of early U.S. cases in this area, see D. Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 310-15 (1998). It is also possible that minority
shareholders may exploit legal mechanisms designed to protect them at the expense of majority
shareholders. For a recent exploration of the minority shareholder "holdout" problem, see A.
Richard Blaiklock, Note, Fiduciary Duties Owed By Frozen-Out Minority Shareholders in Close
Corporations, 30 IND. L. REv. 763 (1997).
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include this risk of sharking by majority shareholders, and it provides a
basis for the development of legal standards to govern this behavior.283
2. Excessive Executive Compensation
Overcompensation of executives is a recurring problem in corporate
law.2 The issue traces at least to the 1930s in the United States.""
Recently, it has returned to prominence for several reasons. First, other
countries pay much lower levels of executive compensation. Second,
the gap between compensation levels of executives and the rest of the
workforce is increasing. Third, levels of executive compensation have
significantly outpaced gains in corporate revenues and profits.m
The legal problem arises from the undue influence that executives
may exert on the board of directors, including any compensation commit-
tee. The influence of corporate executives in choosing the members of
the board has been observed for some time.2" Recently, various meas-
283. Working out exactly what the standard of review for this area should be lies outside
the scope of this Article. For a good introduction to the current debate, compare Coffee, supra
note 278, with Elhauge, supra note 279. A theory of the firm that recognizes this sort of sharking
also helps to justify securities regulation in this area. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
284. For the case against current levels of executive compensation, see DEREK BOK, THE
COST OF TALENT: How EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECTS
AMERICA 95-118 (1993); GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExCESS (1992); Linda J. Barns,
The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND.
L.J. 59 (1992); Car T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate
Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1993). For defense of current practices, see Richard A. Booth,
The Other Side of the Management Compensation Controversy, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 22 (1994);
Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713
(1995); Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125.
285. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933) (holding that payments to executives
with "no relation" to services provided amounted to "misuse and waste"); Detlev Vagts, Chal-
lenges to Executive Compensation: For the Market or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 245-47, 252-
68 (1983) (discussing history and leading cases).
286. See, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 284, at 205-07 (noting that average compensation of
CEOs in 1989 was $2.8 million in the United States compared with $735,000 in Germany and
$310,000 in Japan); see also Johannes M. Pennings, Executive Reward Systems: A Cross-
National Comparison 105 (Wharton School Management Dep't Working Paper No. 105, 1991)
(comparing executive pay in the United States, France, and the Netherlands).
287. One commentator figures the ratio of executive pay to that of rank-and-file employees
to be 120:1 in the United States compared with 21:1 in Germany and 16:1 in Japan. See
CRYSTAL, supra note 284, at 27, 207-09; see also Thurow, supra note 219, at 383-85 (showing
that while CEO pay rose significantly from 1973 to 1993, median real wages for most workers
fell significantly even though GDP increased).
288. See David Cay Johnston, Executive Pay Increases at a Much Faster Rate than Corpo-
rate Revenues and Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, at D4 (reporting that between 1980 and
1995 executive pay rose 182% compared to increases in corporate profits of 127% and corpo-
rate revenues of 129.5%).
289. See supra note 250 and accompanying text; see also SONNY KLEINFELD, STAYING AT
THE Top: THE LIFE OF A CEO 145 (1986) ("Why do executives make such seemingly scandal-
ous sums of money? Easy. They are the ones who decide how they should be compensated.
Boards of directors do no more than offer pro forma blessings (and directors pretty much serve
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ures have been adopted to address executive compensation, such as re-
quiring disclosure in federal securities filings2' ° and eliminating corporate
tax deductions for compensation in excess of one million dollars annually
which is not tied to stock performance.291 However, these measures have
been judged to have had "no effect.",22 In fact, executive pay rose even
faster after these provisions were adopted. 293
In the past, corporate law provided for substantive review of inordi-
nate executive compensation.294 Since at least 1960, however, most courts
have been hostile to substantive challenges to executive compensation in
large public corporations. Approval by compensation committees com-
posed of disinterested directors acting in good faith is sufficient to pre-
vent substantive judicial review of even the most outrageously generous
compensation deals.25 In the absence of this procedure, however, a
compensation plan may run into trouble, especially if it does not assure
that a corporation gets a benefit for its money, such as in a plan involving
stock options to be exercised in the far-distant future.296
Legal scholars have taken a number of different approaches to this is-
sue. One approach is to say: Don't worry-labor markets for executive
compensation are working correctly.2 7 Agency costs theorists argue that
at the pleasure of the chief executive.)"); Johnston, supra note 288, at D4 ("[C]hief executives
are paying themselves.... They have all this diaphanous language about performance and all
these committee reports on how pay was determined, but the simple truth is that executives are
setting their own pay.") (quoting Robert Monks).
290. See Regulation S-K, Item 402.
291. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (West Supp. 1997).
292. See Johnston, supra note 288, at D4 (quoting Michael Graetz).
293. See id. (reporting that executive compensation increased at a 29% faster rate after the
tax law change). For a skeptical view of the effectiveness of securities disclosure and tax ap-
proaches before these figures proved him right, see Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The
Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1867, 1885-96 (1992) (reviewing
GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991)); see also Murphy, Politics, Economics, and
Executive Compensation, supra note 284, at 739 (predicting that tax changes for executive com-
pensation under § 162(m) would result ironically in higher levels of compensation).
294. See supra note 285 and accompanying text. In addition, executive salaries were held in
check after the stock market crash in 1929 by economic conditions, wartime salary stabilization,
and progressive income taxation. See Barris, supra note 284, at 62.
295. See, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960) (upholding a stock option
compensation package against challenge when it had been approved by disinterested directors);
Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ("Yes, the Court possesses the power to
prune these payments, but openness forces the confession that the pruning would be synthetic
and artificial rather than analytic or scientific. Whether or not it would be fair and just, is highly
dubious."), affjd mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup. Ct. 1941); see also Barris, supra note 284, at 75
("So long as full disclosure is made and the compensation is approved by disinterested directors,
it will be reviewed under the business judgment standard with only a cursory review, if any, for
fairness to the corporation.").
296. See, e.g., Byrne v. Lord, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [1995-1996 Transfer Binder]
98,987, at 93,800-02 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 1995) (striking down a stock option plan not shown to
provide a benefit to the corporation for the bargain).
297. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 284, at 51-52 (arguing that "nothing but the market should
regulate the process" of setting compensation and "executives should get their due"). This view
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executive compensation is not excessive as long as payment of executives^298
is tied to stock performance. Another approach argues for vigorous
board oversight of executive pay and encourages tying the pay of board
members to stock price.2"
The legal theory of the firm advanced here, however, casts doubt on
approaches to thinking about the problem of executive compensation as
a bilateral one between shareholders as principals and top-level manag-
ers as agents3 ° Conceiving executive compensation to be a problem of
principal costs or sharking suggests that a return to a "reasonableness"
test under the law of fiduciary duties may be in order, at least in some
circumstances.30' Excessive executive compensation is not simply a kind
of shirking because in some cases the executives are arguably over-
reaching their authority as quasi-principals in setting their own salaries.3°z
Excessive executive compensation involves a type of self-dealing that in-
volves not a secret diversion of assets, but rather an abuse of authority. A
judicial determination that a compensation package results from over-
reaching by executives, rather than due deliberation by disinterested di-
rectors, would show it more likely to represent opportunism than reason-
is consistent with what Charles Yablon calls the "financial zeitgeist" of the 1980s and early
1990s. Yablon, supra note 293, at 1881. With salaries for sports figures, movie stars, and other
entertainers in the stratosphere compared to most people, the argument that corporate execu-
tives are overpaid is difficult to sustain. See id; see also Barris, supra note 284, at 65 (discussing
"the ballplayer analogy").
298. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-t's Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138; Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Mur-
phy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990); Geoffrey
S. Rehnert, Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency
Costs, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1147 (1985).
299. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34
B.C. L. REv. 937 (1993). A problem with this approach is that it assumes that a significant
amount of an average board member's compensation derives from board memberships. In fact,
many of them are CEOs themselves with their own lucrative compensation deals. See supra
notes 250, 289 and accompanying text; see also Barris, supra note 284, at 76 ("It is not unusual
for chief executives to sit on one another's compensation committees in the capacity of outside
directors. These CEOs may approve increases for friends because they expect the favor will be
returned, or simply because the corporate environment in which they operate approves of lavish
spending on top executives. So much for impartiality.").
300. See supra Part II and Section V.D; see also Teresa A. John & Kose John, Top-
Management Compensation and Capital Structure, 48 J. FIN. 949, 952 (1993) ("In the design of
managerial contracts, an optimally structured compensation system depends not only on the
agency relationship between shareholders and managers, but also on the other agency relation-
ships that constitute the firm.").
301. For arguments along these lines, see Vagts, supra note 285, at 276 ("[C]ourts can and
should carefully scrutinize compensation that is substantially out of the line and prune off the
abnormal amount when not justified by special risks run by the executive recipients or special
contributions made by them."); Yablon, supra note 293, at 1899 (arguing for a "proportionality"
standard of review of the "reasonableness" of executive compensation). Much of the case law
regarding "reasonableness" of executive compensation comes from close corporation cases and
tax law. See Barris, supra note 284, at 81-88 (collecting and discussing cases); Vagts, supra note
285, at 257-61 (same)
302. See supra notes 250,289,299 and accompanying text.
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able business judgment. 3
3. Downgrading Creditors
As discussed above, creditors lie on a contested boundary of the
firm.3 Sharking captures the possibility of opportunism by enterprise-
organizers against their creditors. In other words, corporate managers
and shareholders may exercise their authority as principals and quasi-
principals to transfer wealth inappropriately from creditors to them-
selves. To use another metaphor, they may "scalp" their creditors.05
The classical response to this problem is to say that creditors never
deserve extra-contractual protection. Creditors execute contracts, and
their contracts express the limit of any obligation owed to them by man-
agers or shareholders.3 In most situations, this answer is sufficient. A
fundamental feature of the structure of the corporate firm lies in the ten-
sion between residual owners (shareholders) and creditors. This tension
is resolved primarily through contractual bargaining.
In some situations, however, this strict view of no extra-contractual
duties proves unsatisfactory. If creditors are never owed non-contractual
protection, then managers and shareholders have an incentive to take
303. I do not intend to propose what a "reasonableness" test under a fiduciary duty for the
review of executive compensation would look like. I mean only to suggest a theoretical justifica-
tion for a fiduciary duty analysis that may proceed along these lines. Closer analysis of the ex-
ecutive compensation problem may recommend another approach, such as the reestablishment
of a progressive income tax. See, e.g., BOK, supra note 284, at 275-80 (recommending a move to
progressive taxation as a remedy for excessive executive compensation). For other arguments
favoring progressive taxation, see Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the
Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905 (1987); Walter J.
Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417
(1952). My point is only to identify executive compensation as one area that illustrates how
sharking costs may reduce the efficiency of the firm in the absence of appropriate legal con-
straints, which may include the vigorous enforcement of fiduciary duties.
304. See supra Subsection V.C.1.
305. It is also true that creditors may behave opportunistically against their debtors. See,
e.g., Mann, supra note 227, at 663-68 (explaining opportunistic behavior of creditors as a reason
for the relative scarcity of secured credit). One might describe this tendency as the sharking of
creditors against the firm, but I prefer to restrict the term to the opportunism of principals and
quasi-principals acting within the firm as defined above. Ordinarily, creditors are outside the
boundaries of the firm, but a sharking analysis could be extended to secured creditors and credi-
tors involved in bankruptcy reorganizations. This analytical extension, however, remains out-
side the scope of this Article. See supra Section II.A (defining sharking).
306. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 36 ("For most firms the expec-
tation is that the residual risk bearers have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run prof-
its of the firm, which in turns maximizes the value of their stock. Other participants contract for
fixed payouts-monthly interest, salaries, pensions, severance payments, and the like."); id. at
37 ("Each investor must live with the structure of risks built into the firm. Equity claimants lose
out to debt claimants when times are bad and are not thereby entitled to some additional com-
pensation. It is all a matter of enforcing the contracts. And for any.., investor other than the
residual claimant, that means the explicit, negotiated contract."); see also sources cited supra
note 229.
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every advantage of new circumstances or contractual ambiguity.
Again, one can adopt a hard-line position and say that creditors in these
situations should have known better or at least will learn to protect them-
selves contractually in the future."' However, this approach ignores sig-
nificant harm that results to creditors given the relative unpredictability
of the future, the continual invention of new financial instruments, and
the creative legal interpretation of contracts, especially when the stakes
are high. In addition to unfairness, willingness to risk loaning capital may
decline, which would harm the economy as a whole.3°9 At least partially
as a result, a number of extra-contractual legal provisions protect credi-
tors from sharking by debtor corporations.310 A theory of the firm that
307. See William W. Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 667, 704 ("Bondholder expectations persistently outpace contract protections and
are frustrated by remote risks."). A few recent examples of corporate reorganizations designed
to benefit shareholders through sharp practices that harm creditors illustrate the point. Several
years ago, Marriott Corporation spun-off a part of the corporation, which put the remaining
bondholders at much greater risk, and the value of their bonds declined dramatically. Although
the reorganization benefited shareholders, it arguably should have been illegal if the sole moti-
vation was to transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders. For a more detailed discussion of
this transaction, see Orts, supra note 93, at 1606-11; F. John Stark et al., "Marriott Risk": A New
Model Covenant to Restrict Transfers of Wealth from Bondholders to Stockholders, 1994
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 503, 586 (discussing Marriott and concluding "[b]oth traditional legal
remedies and the traditional form of bond indenture are inadequate" to protect bondholders
from "event risk" and calling for judicial reform). A similar story can be told about the RJR
Nabisco leveraged buyout, which hurt bondholders who failed to negotiate "event change"
covenants in the bond indentures. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F.
Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Another type of problem known as "bondholder coercion" occurs
when managers use the threat of bankruptcy or adverse indenture amendments to force credi-
tors to agree to a change in contractual terms. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein,
Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapi-
talizations, 58 U. CH. L. REV. 1207 (1991); see also Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders
and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821 (1992) (discussing
strategic behavior of debtors working to deny bondholders truly volitional consent). But see
Lewis S. Peterson, Note, Who's Being Greedy? A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of
Holdouts and Coercion in Debt Tender and Exchange Offers, 103 YALE L.J. 505, 509 (1993)
(finding that "the coercion problem has been overrated" and "the more serious problem of
holdouts derailing apparently good offers demands increased attention").
308. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. For an argument along these lines with re-
spect to the development of "event risk" covenants, see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment, 40
UCLA L. REv. 931 (1993).
309. See, e.g., Triantis & Daniels, supra note 230, at 1073, 1081 (emphasizing importance of
"the role of lenders" in corporate governance and supporting "rules that prevent one stake-
holder from benefiting at another stakeholder's expense in situations where it is likely that con-
flicts of interests among stakeholders outweigh the benefits arising from the signals sent by
stakeholder action").
310. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17
CARDOZO L. REv. 647, 689 (1996) (discussing various legal sources in addition to explicit con-
tracts imposing duties to creditors and arguing for a "unified theory of a corporate debtor's ob-
ligation to creditors"). Various provisions of bankruptcy law are, of course, designed to protect
creditors. The law prohibiting fraudulent conveyances is another example of a substantial body
of non-contractual law favoring creditors. See CLARK, supra note 268, at 40-52; J.B. Heaton,
Debt Capacity and Fraudulent Conveyance Law (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Creditors receive greater legal protection in some other countries, such as in Germany.
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recognizes the danger of sharking provides a rationale for this kind of le-
gal protection, which in some extraordinary circumstances includes fidu-
ciary duties.311
4. Financial Reengineering
A fourth type of sharking refers to the possibility that certain kinds of
corporate reorganizations or recapitalizations sponsored by controlling
shareholders or managers may achieve changes in capital structure and
control that may harm other corporate participants without an appropri-
ate business purpose. This type of sharking is a variant of the temptation
to use a reorganization to freezeout minority shareholders unfairly.312
Shareholders and executives of a public corporation may also use a reor-
ganization or recapitalization to enrich themselves at the expense of
other interests, such as creditors.313 What may be called financial reengi-
neering often yields benefits in terms of enabling firms to compete effi-
ciently in organizational metamarkets, but it can also be misused.314
For example, the management-led leveraged buyout (MBO) raises
the possibility that managers may act self-interestedly in seeking owner-
ship as well as control.315 In these transactions, shareholders may not be
See, e.g., Harold Herrmann, Creditor's Protection as Help for Self-Protection: A Comparative
Study of Quasi-Equity in German and United States Law (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
311. As discussed above, a fiduciary duty to creditors may arise in "near insolvency" situa-
tions. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. Also in bankruptcy reorganizations, corporate
directors may owe fiduciary duties to creditors as well as shareholders. See, e.g., Harvey R.
Miller, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between Directors and
Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 1467 (1993);
see also supra note 228 and accompanying text. An alternative to recognizing fiduciary duties to
creditors in various situations is to expand contractual principles of "good faith" or
"unconscionability" which may serve as the functional equivalent. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note
22, at 652-53; see also Tauke, supra note 229, at 79-80 (arguing that an expansive "modern ap-
proach" to interpretation of contracts tends to achieve "fairness" to bondholders and "shares
substantial common ground with the concept of fiduciary duty").
312. See supra Subsection VI.B.1.
313. See supra Subsection VI.B.3. It is also possible that a recapitalization may have a nega-
tive impact on majority as well as minority shareholders. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond:
Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1988)
(citing empirical evidence that dual class recapitalizations have a "negative impact on share-
holder wealth" and supporting legal restrictions).
314. For discussion of the salutary effect that increased debt obligations can have in moti-
vating and disciplining managers, see supra note 230 and accompanying text. Courses in
"Financial Engineering" are taught at leading business schools (including the Wharton School).
My criticism of financial reengineering in the text is limited to cases that involve wealth trans-
fers within the firm without a redeeming economic justification from the point of view of the
firm as a whole.
315. For a recent analysis of the standards of review applied to MBOs in the Delaware
courts, see Rock, supra note 62, at 1022-63 (reviewing cases); see also Scott V. Simpson, The
Emerging Role of the Special Committee-Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in the
Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Con-
flicts of Interest, 43 Bus. LAW. 665 (1988). For criticism of current standards of review of MBOs,
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treated fairly, managers may be motivated to aggrandize themselves, or
the reorganization may harm other participants in the firm including
creditors. At present, the standards of review for MBOs are relatively
lax.
316
This is not to say that all leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, or reor-
ganizations should be legally impermissible. My point is only to illustrate
the potential problem of sharking by the principals and quasi-principals
who promote these transactions. Recognizing the danger may support
stricter legal standards of review to show the economic worth of these
transactions for the enterprise as a whole. An enhanced fiduciary duty
analysis may be employed toward this end.
The usual justification for a free market in transactions that result in a
change of corporate control and capital structure is that the market fairly
prices the "ownership" of the company and that paying a premium for
the shares over the market price is an adequate indication of the fairness
of the transaction. The theory of the firm outlined here, however, recog-
nizes important roles played in the firm by participants other than major-
ity shareholders. Greater scrutiny should be given to changes of control
or financial structure of a firm when these changes threaten significant
harm to other interests. In fact, the law provides greater scrutiny in many
instances. Evidence of diversions of wealth from one group of corporate
participants to another is often sufficient to enjoin a proposed transaction
of this type or to award damages for harm the transaction causes to other
groups.1 7 Courts should continue to scrutinize corporate reorganizations
and recapitalizations for potential sharking.
see Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (1985), and James R. Re-
petti, Management Buyouts, Efficient Markets, Fair Value, and Soft Information, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 121 (1988). For defenses of a lax standard of review, see Richard A. Booth, Management
Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1985),
and J. Robert Brown, Jr., In Defense of Management Buyouts, 65 TUL. L. REV. 57 (1990). For
general discussion, see Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Approval By Disinterested Directors, 20 J. CORP.
L. 215 (1995); Deborah A. DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged
Recapitalizations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1988); Dale A. Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Manage-
ment Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REv. 207 (1988);
and Bill Shaw, Resolving the Conflict of Interest in Management Buyouts, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV.
143 (1990).
316. See sources cited id.
317. See, e.g., 3 COX ET AL., supra note 23, §§ 23.1 to 23.4 (1995); see also Jay W. Eisen-
hofer & John L. Reed, Valuation Litigation, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 56 (1997) ("The fiduciary
duty of loyalty forbids corporate fiduciaries, including directors, officers, and controlling stock-
holders, from considering or acting to protect interests other than those of the corporation when
making business decisions. For example, a fiduciary cannot use his or her position in the corpo-
ration to promote a transaction between the corporation and an entity in which he or she has a
substantial economic interest, unless that transaction is substantively fair to the corporation.").
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CONCLUSION
The separation of ownership from management, the development of the cor-
porate structure so as to vest in small groups control over the resources of
great numbers of small and uninformed investors, make imperative a fresh
and active devotion to [the fiduciaryl principle if the modern world of busi-
ness is to perform its proper function. 1
Justice Harlan Stone's advice, given over half a century ago in the
depths of the Great Depression, remains apt today even as business en-
terprise and capital markets grow increasingly large and global. As in the
time of Dickens and Shakespeare,319 the shirking and sharking of agents
and principals will continue, and the discipline of markets alone will
prove an insufficient remedy. Law should evolve with the ever-changing
forms of business organization to constrain the opportunism of both
agents and principals within firms. Traditional fiduciary duties should be
continually updated to constrain the costs of shirking and sharking, and
legal procedures should permit substantive claims made with reasonable
evidence to go forward.
Economic theories of the firm contribute analytical clarity to thinking
about the structure of business organization. However, they tend to em-
ploy oversimplified models of the legal structure of business. The law of
agency and enterprise organization-including partnerships, limited li-
ability companies, and corporations-provides an essential extension to
economic theories of the firm. The boundaries of the firm are formed not
only by relationships of ownership and contracts, but also agency author-
ity and power.
The theory of the firm advanced here is descriptive in seeking to clar-
ify the role of law. Legal agency enables the formation of authority,
power, and hierarchy among individual participants in business. Once the
importance of legal agency is recognized, a focus on agency costs is re-
vealed as too narrow; principal costs must also be included. Legally, a
business firm of more than one person is a nexus of agency relationships
in which (1) vertical authority provides the means to compete as an or-
ganized entity in markets and (2) horizontal ownership facilitates the ag-
gregation of financial capital.
The organizational structures of firms enable feats of economic pro-
ductivity unimaginable without them. At the same time, these organiza-
tional structures present temptations for their participants to shirk and
shark against one another's interests. In other words, the authority and
power in business firms explain the efficiency gains they achieve, but this
318. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1934).
319. See supra notes 1, 24 and accompanying text.
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very authority and power open avenues for potential abuse. As a sup-
plement to economics, a legal theory of the firm provides a descriptive
foundation from which to inquire into normative issues of whether the
current regulation of business enterprise achieves an appropriate balance
between (1) the economic flexibility that markets need to function effi-
ciently and (2) the legal constraints on the abuse of authority and power
in firms needed to establish norms of social trust for economic stability
and progress.3
Abuse of authority and power in the firm also has a normative dimen-
sion beyond economic analysis. Ethics as well as economics should set
the ground rules of contemporary business civilization. In considering the
concept of agency from an ethical point of view, Amartya Sen distin-
guishes between ethical calculations of self-interested "well being" and
other-related "agency. 32' An individual enters agency relationships in
order to pursue goals, commitments, and values through organization.
32
Neoclassical economic models mistakenly assume an "exclusively self-
interested motivation."3'2 Restoring the importance of law in under-
standing business firms broadens the policy debate in the law of enter-
prise organization to include ethical dimensions of agency responsibility
320. In 1992 in the United Kingdom, the Cadbury Committee on Financial Aspects of Cor-
porate Governance expressed the need for a similar balance between two basic principles of
corporate governance: "They [i.e., managers and directors] must be free to drive their compa-
nies forward but exercise that freedom within a framework of effective accountability."
JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 4 (1994) (quoting the Cadbury Committee's report). On the eco-
nomic importance of promoting trust, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
321. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 41 (1987).
322. See id This is not to say that one's actions as an agent do not have an effect on one's
well-being. One's role as an agent can have either a positive or negative effect on well-being.
See Amartya Sen, Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J. PHIL. 169,
187 (1985). "Even when the impact is positive," however, "the importance of the agency aspect
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Legal Theory of the Firm
as well as economic efficiency. By imposing appropriate standards of be-
havior on participants in firms, including fiduciary duties, legal regulation
can improve overall economic efficiency and promote ethical norms of
good business practice. In this endeavor, the costs of sharking by those in
authority are as significant as the costs of shirking by the firm's more
lowly stationed agents.

